Shepherd vol 2 ebook: Chapter 6: Shepherd on Reason

Chapter 6: Shepherd on Reason 

In this chapter, I shall continue looking at the men Shepherd refers to in her treatises, especially Lawrence and Brown. I will adopt an approach that Shepherd used herself when discussing a primary text, that is, to provide quite a full quote so the reader can grasp the original primary text by their own light of reason and assess it for themselves alongside my discussion and evaluation of it. In this chapter, I shall focus on Shepherd’s recurrent emphasis on, and prioritising of, the faculty of reason. In these passages, I demonstrate how pivotal reason is to Shepherd's approach to philosophy and how vital it is to understanding her critique of other philosophers such as Hume, Thomas Brown and Lawrence. The quotes I will highlight here, centre around Shepherd’s criticism of Hume in her 1824 treatise: ‘An essay upon the relation of cause and effect: controverting the doctrine of Mr. Hume, concerning the nature of that relation, with observations upon the opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence connected with the same subject’¹. 

As we saw in my previous chapter, Brown supported and built on Hume's theory of causation, and Lawrence built on Brown's views on cause and effect. In this way, Hume interlinks with both Lawrence and Brown's notion of cause and effect. Hence, I suggest, one needs to balance all three men in mind, both when I assess each one individually, as well as in relation to each other. 

Now I shall examine Chapter 2 of this 1824 treatise², which, in the year 2024, is the 200th anniversary of its publication. In this book, Shepherd enumerates her various objections to Hume's account of causation, by attempting to logically prove: 

“FIRST, That reason, not fancy and "custom”, leads us to the knowledge, That every thing which begins to exist must have a Cause. SECONDLY, That reason forces the mind to perceive, that similar causes must necessarily produce similar effects. THIRDLY, I shall thence establish a more philosophical definition of the relation of Cause and Effect. FOURTHLY, show, in what respects Mr. Hume's definition is faulty. FIFTHLY, proceed to prove that Nature cannot be supposed to alter her Course without a contradiction in terms; and, finally, show, that Custom and Habit alone are not our guides; but chiefly reason, for the regulation of our expectations in ordinary life.”³

Here we see that half of Shepherd's contras against Hume are put forward because she wants to enlarge the importance of our capacity to reason⁴. She strongly favours reason over fancy, custom and habit and she views it as the main tool we use to guide our thoughts and assessments of why something is the case⁵. Shepherd also considers reason as a way of reaching solid knowledge about the world⁶. 

I maintain that this is an excellent point: reason and rational argument is the gold standard by which ordinary people, as well as philosophers, aim for when trying to attain knowledge about true facts of a matter, or general knowledge, and scientific knowledge, and so on. Hence, I think Shepherd is right to claim that one is more likely to reach something like true, justified knowledge, and to have a better grasp of what caused this or that particular phenomenon, if one sharpens one’s rationality and if one uses sound, reasoned thinking and argumentation. Custom and habit are perhaps what people realistically often rely on, so I suggest that Hume may be right on a descriptive level. But, I nevertheless argue that it leaves one open to poor customs and habits of thinking. This, I suggest, can consequently lead one down the wrong paths, towards false beliefs and fake narratives, without the aid of reason to highlight our faulty thinking. 

So, I maintain that perhaps Hume is correct on a descriptive, psychological level, but Shepherd is also right to ask us to aim higher and strain ourselves to increase our rationality and rigorously reason our way to secure, true, justified, rigorous knowledge of the world. 

Hence, the purpose of the other half of Shepherd’s contras is simply that she wishes Hume had been more logical and analytical, such as making his definitions more philosophically rigorous and avoiding a contradiction. I suggest that, in this passage, Shepherd comes across rather like a Rationalist, such as Spinoza, due to her heavy emphasis on reason being paramount to understanding, above all else, and through her methodological preference for arguing from precise definitions and avoidance of contradictions. I argue that, by increasing the role of logical and analytical thinking, Shepherd hopes to also increase the powers of our capacity for high level reasoning so we can better understand ourselves and the world, especially in terms of science and medicine, which is why she's assessed Lawrence's theories of physiology alongside her philosophical claims. 

Moreover, later on in Shepherd's 1824 treatise, titled ‘An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect : Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of that Relation, with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence Connected with the Same Subject’⁷, one again sees how Shepherd centres her arguments on meticulous reasoning, not just where Hume is concerned but also in her appraisal of Brown's philosophy:

“He is excellent in detecting some of Mr. Hume's fallacies; but in not allowing that the proposition, "like Causes must have like Effects” to be founded on reason, is equally guilty of a most important one himself.”⁸

So here again, one sees that Shepherd is astute to fallacies and sees reason as so foundational, that if a philosopher doesn't advocate reason as being behind cause and effect, then that philosopher is in error. 

Hence, I suggest that one notices her repeated objections to a lack of involvement of the faculty of reason, throughout this 1824 treatise⁹. For instance, textual support for my claim is when Shepherd rejects:

“The second proposition of Mr. Hume's Theory is, that even "after experience the relation of Cause and Effect cannot be discovered by reason.”¹⁰

Furthermore, Shepherd is equally unimpressed that:

“To this Dr. Brown also agrees.”¹¹

So, on the following page, she declares that:

“....Dr. Brown's argument, against reason, must be examined more minutely;”¹²

before she generally concludes, a few pages later, that she cannot support a view that gives such a small role for our capacity to reason, in favour of other factors cited by Brown, such as “instinctive belief”¹³ and “blind impulse of faith”¹⁴. I find these interesting notions for Shepherd to reject, given that these are commonplace among religious people, including philosophers. Here's the textual support for my interpretation in full, on page 145 of Shepherd’s treatise: ‘An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect:

“I can only express my regret, that he could suppose, a notion of belief, founded upon the influence of the imagination, rather than of reason, to be a rock on which we might build our house, without "danger of the storm and tempest.......

....Nor is Dr. Brown's "blind impulse of faith" a much more secure one. He imagines such a principle to be the foundation of all demonstrative reasoning ; but it is really not so.””¹⁵

In this way, I maintain that this shows that Shepherd’s objection to philosophical theories that reduce the role of reason explicitly extends to Brown’s theory of, what he calls, instinctive belief. Shepherd summarises Brown's argument thus:

“Dr. Brown says, "I know it from instinctive belief, arising from the observation of seeing in any one instance, certain Effects follow given Causes”.¹⁶

To which she replies with the following counter-argument:

“Now I confess, I do not know what "instinctive belief" means, except as applied to the mysterious manner in which animals know of the qualities of bodies previous to experience, by some laws beyond our scrutiny; or at most our conscious belief, of the existence of a simple sensation.

Intuitive belief, I understand; and by it is meant, that in the relation of the two members of a proposition, the truth is contained in the definition of the terms ; and cannot be altered without altering the signs of the ideas, which have been just allowed to stand for them. But to say that instinctive, or intuitive belief, can arise in the mind, as a conclusive proposition, when it requires experience, in order to form some DATA for its premises ; is to say you believe a thing, without a reason for it, and that you are sure of it, because you are sure of it, although you do want an experiment, in order to form a basis for the proposition, which is to be a reason for your instinctive conclusion. This is Dr. Brown's Theory.”¹⁷

I shall endeavour to concisely unpack this rather dense and complex argument here. It seems to me that Shepherd thinks the notion of the type of intuitive, or instinctive, belief that Brown is advocating leaves too much room for an air of mysteriousness that allows things to lie beyond one’s reasoning, and therefore, by implication, beyond one's rational scrutiny, which she finds an unacceptable drawback. Furthermore, Shepherd finds it philosophically unacceptable to allow instinctive or intuitive beliefs to function as a type of conclusion in itself, because it entails claiming that you hold a belief about something that you feel very sure about, even though you have no reason to do so. This would also give rise to a contradiction if you were to then also wish to base this on an experiment that you rely on, to generate reasons within and for your propositions and conclusions. 

In passages such as these, I also suggest that Shepherd comes across as almost even more of a Rationalist than Spinoza, given that even he, as a thorough-going 17th century Rationalist, gives a more important role to the imagination than she is prepared to do. 

In the next chapter, I shall continue to analyse Shepherd's views, debates with philosophers, and her general approach to philosophy in her writings. 

¹Shepherd, Mary. An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect : Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of That Relation, with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence Connected with the Same Subject 

(London, United Kingdom, Printed for T. Hookham, 1824),

 http://archive.org/details/essayuponrelatio00shepiala 

²Ibid

³Ibid p27-28

⁴Ibid

⁵Ibid

⁶Ibid

⁷Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect 

⁸Ibid p138-9

⁹Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect

¹⁰Ibid p140

¹¹Ibid

¹²Ibid p141

¹³Ibid p137-8

¹⁴Ibid p145

¹⁵Ibid

¹⁶Ibid p137

¹⁷Ibid p137-8