I think there are good grounds for my argument that Shepherd
is highly aware of what is and isn’t circular or begging the question.
In her first treatise, Shepherd
provides us with pertinent examples of philosophers’ reasoning which she
maintains argues in a circle:
“Now this method of placing the
argument is but the statement of another circle; for causation is used as the
very principle which lies at the foundation of the whole system; and afterwards
we are desired to search for the impression, which is the CAUSE of that EFFECT,
viz. the idea causation.”[i]
In other words, Shepherd thinks
that Hume is arguing in a circle because he is already using one and the same
idea (causation) both as a foundational principle in his system of thought
whilst also being in the process of examining this idea (of causation through
talking about an aspect of causation, namely impressions which cause effects).
This would constitute a larger circle but a circle nonetheless because, by
examining impressions, it is easy to forget that he may be categorising
them as a type of causation. So he is not recycling the same words but he may
be recycling the same idea of causation. In addition, she argues that Hume
reuses the same proposition in his arguments about causation, which she
considers a lack “of logical precision”[ii]:
“Such a notion ends in the
formation of a mere identical proposition; viz. a certain association of ideas
is causation; and causation consists in an association of ideas.”[iii]
Another example she gives in this
first treatise not only shows us another example of what she thinks constitutes
arguing in a circle but also relates to her views on laws of nature and
miracles in her second treatise:
“Now shortly the whole of this
reasoning concerning the possibility of nature altering her course, is but a
circle! for the argument is invented to show that CUSTOM not REASON, must be
the only ground of our belief in the relation of Cause and Effect. But it is
impossible to imagine such a change in nature, unless reason were previously
excluded as the principle of that relation; and it is impossible to exclude
reason as the principle of that relation, except by supposing that nature may
alter her course. Thus the idea of causation, is founded only on experience,
experience is supplied with arguments by custom not by reason and custom is
supported in her authority by a supposed change in nature, impossible to any
idea of causation, Unless ALREADY SUPPOSED TO BE MERELY THE EFFECT OF CUSTOM”[iv]
Here, her objection amounts to
the observation that there are implicit, unstated assumptions about nature
changing course and custom which is used to help him prove his argument and is
re-used in his conclusion. By adding in these implicit assumptions, she can
sketch the elongated circular structure of Hume’s argument. Again, Shepherd is
showing great depth of knowledge about how an argument inadvertently ends up
circular. Her view that Hume suffers from circularity seems to also be shared
by Dr. Brown whose demonstration of Hume’s circularity she commends[v]. She strikes me as quite scathing of such
errors, perhaps because she sees circular argumentation as an attempt to unfairly
convince the unsuspecting reader by misleading them with “sophism”[vi].
There is some further textual
evidence in both her treatises from which we can garner specific information on
how Shepherd thought a philosopher can avoid a circular argument.
In Shepherd’s second treatise,
there is a passage in her essay ‘Of Miracles’ which shows us how she checks for
and avoids circularity:
“First, It is objected,
"That to say, the doctrine proves the miracles, and that the miracles
prove the doctrine, is to argue in A CIRCLE.
To this objection I would simply
reply, that it possesses no force, when the questions to which it relates, are
properly distinguished in their conception, and separated in their statements.”[vii]
…. “When these two latter
questions are answered in the affirmative, no illogical answer in a circle is
given to them, as any one may plainly perceive, however little skilled in the
technical rules of reasoning.”[viii]
In this passage, I think, we
learn three key ways in which a circular argument is avoided, according to
Shepherd.
One, the concepts used in the
questions behind the argument need to be carefully demarcated. Shepherd may
think this is important because it avoids the general error of conflating
concepts. However, I suggest the main reason she may include distinguishing
concepts when specifically talking about circularity is that vagueness is a
characteristic feature of circular arguments. A “whiff of vagueness” often
arouses suspicion that an argument may be circular, as does over-inclusive terms[ix].
Nevertheless, circularity, although difficult to pin down and prove, can try to
steer clear of vagueness and “be rescued by a distinction”[x].
Furthermore, if an argument is “relying on the ambiguity of” a word or term by,
for instance, exploiting various connotations people have, then it also
constitutes a “misuse of Etymology”[xi].
Indeed, question begging words and phrases is something we see Shepherd
criticising Berkeley for so this must be an aspect of circularity and question
begging that Shepherd took into account. Shepherd writes:
“In the sentence already
commented on, and which contains the sum of Dr. Berkeley's doctrine—the word
object, as well as the phrase "perception by sense" is of ambiguous
application;—for in his use of the word object, he begs the question;”[xii]
Furthermore, Shepherd argues that this is not an unusual
oversight, given that she has not encountered anyone who doesn’t beg the
question when using the word “senses”[xiii].
Not only is Shepherd’s views on question begging and circularity relevant to
her criticism of a central doctrine Berkeley expounded (as well as others such as Hume) but, I
think, it is also specifically relevant to Shepherd’s approach when examining
the topic of miracles where, as I explore later, the root origins and meanings
of the word miracle influence the content and structure of Hume and Shepherd’s
philosophical arguments.
Two, Shepherd supports her claims about circularity and good
reasoning skills by adding the usefulness of separating out the statements in
your argument. This, I think, may be to help with the process of providing good
explanations which is important in analytic philosophy where, although
definitions play an important role, they are only part of the overall analytic
structure of philosophical argumentation.
Three, Shepherd assists this
process with the question and answer approach. Thinking about what your
questions are helps to separate out your statements and answering these
questions checks if you are on the right track. When asking questions together
with the approach in One (of keeping concepts separate and checking for
implicit assumptions and vagueness) you build a good foundation for further
examining, analysing and explaining a topic[xiv].
The question and answer format shows up whether both the explicandum and the
explictum have been addressed and whether they have done enough work in the
argument so that they not only provide questions but they also affirmatively
provide answers too[xv].
Moreover, not only does Shepherd
spot circularity and question begging in other philosophers’ arguments, I
maintain there is also clear textual evidence which shows that Shepherd does go
to great pains to avoid introducing circularity into her own arguments.
One such example is when Shepherd
takes the time to clarify in her ‘Preface To The Essay On The Academical Or
Sceptical Philosophy’ (within her second treatise[xvi])
that her first treatise[xvii]
was meant to have an appendix but instead it has turned into this essay. So her
previous treatise and this essay need to be read and understood in conjunction
with each other, not seen as separate works as such[xviii].
Nevertheless, she states she has made sure she has not fallen into circularity
between her works through making use of some of her reasoning within her first
treatise when drawing conclusions in her second treatise[xix].
One of the key ways she believes she has achieved this is by being cautious
when defining what internal and external existence is, especially in relation
to perceived and unperceived objects and by making sure that it leads to “clearer
ideas of the method and action of causation”[xx].
So she seems to be just as vigilant against vagueness and circularity within
her own argument structure as she is when assessing others’ views.
In the introductory chapter
following this preface, there is another example of Shepherd accounting for and
attempting to avoid circularity in her philosophy[xxi].
She explains that she thinks the way certain philosophers, including Reid, use
the term perception begs the question because they talk about perception in
relation to things that have already been perceived[xxii].
She also elaborates on this point to avoid potential “ambiguity” in her
argument by stating that her use of the word perception is mostly in line with
Hume and Locke and at what times she may vary how she uses the word[xxiii].
Hence, I believe Shepherd when
she states she has avoided circularity. This is one of the reasons why I
suggest, when she also conversely derives arguments for her concept of and
belief in God from her metaphysical arguments, she is attempting to expand on
and clarify her linear argument founded on God in a way that avoids
circularity. It is all too easy to jump to the conclusion that an argument
looks circular at first blush but on closer inspection, discover that it isn’t[xxiv].
Shepherd herself also notes that the general public often seem to be arguing in
a circular fashion when they are not[xxv].
There is more rational and practical content in their argument [xxvi]than
one might suspect. Besides, even if one wished to claim Shepherd nevertheless
displays some circularity, one would have to show that it is a form of
circularity which was avoidable and constituted bad argumentation. Not all
circularity constitutes a vicious circularity[xxvii].
Some forms of circularity are termed virtuous circularity[xxviii]
because they are not weakening the argument. Furthermore, circularity does not
necessarily mean that an argument is logically unsound or untrue[xxix].
Indeed, it can have some benefits, such as helping to provide the “safest possible conclusion” and does not
involve poor reasoning[xxx].
For instance, there is nothing wrong with inferring from it being true that it
is Friday that I should conclude that it is indeed Friday. This may be
uninformative and boring but it is the most sure and true conclusion to make.
So even if one whiffed some circularity in Shepherd’s philosophy, this need not
be a logical flaw in itself. As Lemmon points out:
“It is often thought that to
infer P from P is unsound, on the grounds that the argument is circular, but
this is a misunderstanding”[xxxi]
“…the rule of assumptions is
precisely based on the principle of the soundness of a circular argument; for
the rule of assumptions affirms that, given a certain proposition, we can at
least infer that proposition.”[xxxii]
In stating her logical approach, Shepherd
avoids ambiguity and creating logically fallacious arguments which, I think, in
itself, makes her an important philosopher to research.
[i] Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation
of Cause and Effect : Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the
Nature of That Relation, with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and
Mr. Lawrence Connected with the Same Subject, p89-90.
[ii] Shepherd, p90.
[iii] Shepherd, 90–91.
[iv] Shepherd, p87-8.
[v] Shepherd, p146-7.
[vi] Shepherd, p123.
[vii] Mary Shepherd, ‘“Essay VIII: That Human
Testimony Is Of Sufficient Force To Establish the Credibility Of Miracles.”’,
in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects
Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United
Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), 341–42,
https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/n7/mode/2up.
[viii]
Shepherd, 342–43.
[ix] W. W. Fearnside and W. B. Holther, Fallacy
The Counterfeit of Argument (USA: A Spectrum Book. Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1959), 166–67.
[x] Fearnside and Holther, 166.
[xi] Fearnside and Holther, 168–70.
[xii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation, 204.
[xiii]
Shepherd, p224-5.
[xiv] Maher.
[xv] Maher.
[xvi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[xvii]
Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation
of Cause and Effect : Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the
Nature of That Relation, with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and
Mr. Lawrence Connected with the Same Subject.
[xviii]
Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation, pxi-ii.
[xix] Shepherd, pxii.
[xx] Shepherd, pxii.
[xxi] Shepherd, p7-8.
[xxii]
Shepherd, p7-8.
[xxiii]
Shepherd, p8-9.
[xxiv]
O’Rourke, ‘Handout: Circularity and
Begging the Question’.
[xxv] Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation
of Cause and Effect : Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the
Nature of That Relation, with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and
Mr. Lawrence Connected with the Same Subject, p123.
[xxvi]
Shepherd, p123.
[xxvii]
Maher, ‘Lecture 2 The Methodology of
Explication’.
[xxviii]
Maher.
[xxix]
Lemmon, Beginning Logic, 34.
[xxx] Lemmon, 34.
[xxxi]
Lemmon, 34.
[xxxii]
Lemmon, p34.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.