Shepherd vol 1 ebook chapter 11 Immortality and Eternity

Chapter 11: Immortality and Eternity

The notion of the possibility that our mind could continue in some way, either by returning to a simple state or by changing into another state, as discussed previously, impacts on Shepherd’s view of the immortality of the soul[i]. Hence, when Shepherd frames the question of what would happen to the soul upon death, she wishes to re-formulate the question. She considers the usual focus in philosophy, of whether the soul lives on after bodily decay, somewhat irrelevant and misplaced[ii]. Instead, Shepherd reconsiders the immortality of the soul in terms of whether our mind could have a future life so putting the focus on the mind’s capacities and states rather than whether the soul can exist autonomously of the corporal body[iii]. I base this on her following passage where she states:

“The proper question, therefore, concerning the immortality of the soul, is not whether it can survive the body as a continuous existence — for it must be eternally independant of any particular set of organs in past, as in future time. — But the inquiry should be, whether when the organs which are in relation to any individual capacity, undergo the change called death, if the continuing mental capacity become simple in its aptitudes again, or, whether it remain so far in an altered state by what it has gone through in the present life, that it continues as the result of that modification?”[iv]

Just prior to posing this question, Shepherd[v], argues against the materialist position by carefully disentangling conflations between mind and body in relation to sensation. Our “stream of conscious sensation” triggered by our sensory organs[vi] is intermittent, for instance, we are only aware of our existence when awake but, strictly speaking, not while we are asleep. However, since we do not go in and out of existence, there must be something more continuous that maintains our existence than that which our senses are detecting[vii]. This continuation comes from mind rather than bodily sense organs[viii]. Shepherd has a two pronged explanation of the role of mind resulting from this conclusion, both of which refute the materialistic, atheistic view of the non-existence of God and the eternity of the soul[ix].

In terms of our mind, she argues that, much as our sensations themselves may be intermittent, our capacity for sensation exists consistently, a capacity which she defines as mind[x]. Our individual mind is ever ready to communicate with our sense organs, as and when they relate sensations to our minds[xi]. This description, I think may be related to her prior account of brain function as being “the exponent of the powers of the soul”[xii]. She also describes the soul as being able to have “notions”[xiii] and “an idea (or conclusion from reasoning)”[xiv]. The soul even “perceives” “objects” such as a “coloured” “picture”[xv]. Nevertheless, she rejects that mind, which I read her as distinguishing from the brain, could consist of extended matter, given that matter is not sentient in an uniform way but perhaps depends on what latent capacities are activated by its surrounding circumstances[xvi]. To summarize, Shepherd describes a conflation between bodily senses and the mental capacity for sensation as being as mistaken as confusing “the hands of a watch that mark the hour” with “the essence of time” itself[xvii]. Hence, by not delineating between the senses and “the continuous power which must exist” self-sufficiently from the senses, materialists overlook the rational possibility of something which may be providing us with an eternal existence and essence, irrespective of any variations it may undergo[xviii]. Indeed, given her arguments she puts forward in her Essay X, Shepherd believes her observations and reasoning “demonstrates the essential eternity of all mind; it renders probable any given state of it, as connected with any after state in the relation of cause and effect; whether with or without the revival of memory”[xix]. Furthermore, “Our “capacity”, our “being”, the “subject matter for” our sensations during our lifetime, including our ability to be sensitive to a range of emotions, have an intellect and be capable of movement, could well be immortal in the grand scale of things[xx]. Given that a rational proof of what immortality would look like for certain is beyond the limits of human experience or intellect, Shepherd keeps an open mind as to whether our “individual consciousness of personality” would persist or not and whether, on the possible scenario that the mind persists in an altered, improved state, this would entail improved ethical behaviour, given that Shepherd notes that nature tends towards gradual improvement of the species[xxi].

For Shepherd, the same structure of logical demonstration that she uses earlier in her treatise (to show the existence of and behaviours of human minds) can also be adapted and used to show, through the use of reason, the necessary existence of the “eternal, continuous”, universal mind of God which she describes as “the infinite space for his residence”[xxii]. In terms of God’s universal mind and the role that it has to play in our continuing existence, Shepherd writes that it is the “powers in nature (flowing from that continuous Being the God of Nature,) which are capable of giving birth to that constant effect, the sense of continuous existence”[xxiii]. Shepherd considers the possible objection to her view (that the causation seems often intermittent) and she answers that it is rational to think that, at a more fundamental level than this, there is an “uninterrupted cause” which is “an independant capacity in nature” which accounts for “the complicate being self; which when conscious, could take notice of its existence, and when unconscious, (as in sound sleep) could exist independently of its own observation.”[xxiv]. This passage, I suggest, helps one understand Shepherd’s general views on personal identity in terms of persistence conditions for the existence of self. This is why she prioritises an “uninterrupted” “original cause” sustaining human life and personal identity rather than a persistence of identical “particles” preserving personal identity, both in this life and in a possible afterlife[xxv]. Shepherd goes towards a possible definition of personal identity when she concludes that what we think of as selfhood consists of a “continued existing capacity in nature, (unknown, unperceived,) fitted to revive when suspended in sleep, or otherwise”[xxvi]. In this way, I interpret Shepherd’s[xxvii] views on the afterlife and possible bodily resurrection as being continuous with her views on personal identity. She lessens the importance of a person comprising of the identical set of particles in favour of a person having a continuous mental capacity of sorts.  This mental capacity, for Shepherd, is immaterial, eternal and not perceivable. She also factors in our capacity to revive in a variety of ways, some we know about, such as after sleeping, and some we don’t have knowledge of, such as after death.

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[i] Mary Shepherd, ‘Essay X. On the Eternity of Mind’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/372/mode/1up/search/essay+x.

[ii] Shepherd.

[iii] Shepherd.

[iv] Shepherd, p378-9.

[v] Shepherd, ‘Essay X. On the Eternity of Mind’.

[vi] Shepherd, p374.

[vii] Mary Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/n7/mode/2up.

[viii] Shepherd, ‘Essay X. On the Eternity of Mind’.

[ix] Shepherd, p376.

[x] Shepherd, ‘Essay X. On the Eternity of Mind’.

[xi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[xii] Mary Shepherd, Chapter I. On Continuous Existence. (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p36, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/13/mode/1up.

[xiii] Shepherd, p33.

[xiv] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation, p59.

[xv] Shepherd, p260.

[xvi] Shepherd, ‘Essay X. On the Eternity of Mind’, p375.

[xvii] Shepherd, p376.

[xviii] Shepherd, p376.

[xix] Shepherd, p381.

[xx] Shepherd, p377.

[xxi] Shepherd, p378, 380.

[xxii] Mary Shepherd, ‘Essay XI. On the Immateriality of Mind’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p390, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/386/mode/1up/search/386.

[xxiii] Mary Shepherd, ‘Chapter VII. Application Of the Doctrine Contained In the Preceding Essay To the Evidence Of Our Belief In Several Opinions.’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p154, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/154/mode/2up.

[xxiv] Shepherd, p154-5.

[xxv] Shepherd, p154.

[xxvi] Shepherd, p153.

[xxvii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

Shepherd vol 1 ebook chapter 10 Afterlife Arguments and Analogies

Chapter 10: Afterlife Arguments and Analogies 

Applying this approach to Shepherd’s treatise, I shall now examine her treatment of the topic of the afterlife. Shepherd puts forward her suggestion of the possibility of an afterlife with two main arguments by analogy and a further, supporting analogy of human foetal consciousness.

One analogy is her example of a captain of a ship travelling north, guided by a compass reading[i]. When a compass points north, it is merely indicating the direction of where north actually lies[ii]. The compass needle itself is not where north is geographically located[iii]. In this way, Shepherd shows by analogy that, although a compass needle does not show the precise pinpointed location of north, it does give one an idea in one’s mind of the general, possible location of north[iv]. This idea of north, although not very precise and detailed, is nevertheless, very useful and leads one accurately enough to be able to later refine and specify the exact location of north[v]. Hence, this initial indication giving rise to the idea of north, is logical and accurate enough to lead one to the truth about the more precise location of north. This is shown by the fact that, by using the compass needle reading as a guide, and trusting it will lead the ship in the desired direction, the captain does indeed find the location he or she had an idea of previously[vi]. With her compass analogy, Shepherd is, unusually and perhaps controversially, claiming that inadequate ideas should not be dismissed because, although currently only inadequate, they may lead one to an adequate idea in the future[vii]. In this way, inadequate ideas cannot be used as a means for disproving an argument outright.

This compass analogy parallels Shepherd’s argument for the possibility of an afterlife. Just as one can have an idea of north so, similarly, she notes that many people have an idea of the afterlife. Hence, Shepherd[viii] thinks it would be rash not to leave the possibility of an afterlife open in one’s philosophy since an idea in one’s mind may be good enough rational evidence and justification to argue that the afterlife potentially exists and is true and that one can rationally trust one’s ideas of it. She reminds the reader that one could only give the kind of adequate proof of the existence of an afterlife that is often demanded once one has actually reached the afterlife[ix]. Hence, in this life, it is impossible to provide a proof of the reality of an afterlife if one insists on certain knowledge based on sensory perception[x].

However, for Shepherd, this is setting the bar too high because our brains, which are thinking through the possibility of an afterlife, are too limited and so what brains can or cannot conceive of is somewhat irrelevant[xi]. Indeed, for Shepherd, reaching the state of an afterlife is not reliant on whether we use our brains or not[xii]. Objects can be real on the basis that the notion gives rise to happiness and hopefulness in ethical people[xiii]. Much as this may seem as though Shepherd is arguing for a weak criteria, such as the reality of an afterlife can be satisfied as long as the notion gives rise to happiness and hopefulness in ethical people[xiv], this is not the main thrust of her argument. Shepherd mainly supports the possibility of an afterlife with her refined definition of a notion. Contra Idealists, Shepherd reaches the conclusion that notions of unperceived existences, such as an afterlife, are possible via reason, which she categorizes as “a certain set of sensations”[xv]. She supports this with the argument that one has a notion of death, despite this state not giving rise to sensations[xvi]. Nevertheless, one can understand the meaning of the notion of death because one can grasp the notion via “negative ideas which stand as the signs of those ideas”[xvii]. Furthermore, the very act of distinguishing between perceivable and non-perceivable objects entails “predicating something concerning unperceived objects; and concerning our knowledge of them in their unperceived state”[xviii]. In this way, Shepherd points out the illogicality and self-contradiction of arguing that one cannot have notions or knowledge of unperceivable states because one is incapable of uttering this statement without already possessing a notion of and a certain amount of knowledge of the existence of unperceivable states or objects. Moreover, according to Shepherd, this knowledge of unperceivable states or objects comes from a type of sensation, namely, reflection[xix]. This means that, if one takes all types of sensations possible into account, then one can show that it is possible to gain knowledge of unperceived, continuous existences.

Shepherd also remains flexible about the possibility of resurrection or a similar state to resurrection in an afterlife[xx]. One religious reason for this is that humans were not present when God decided to make us in His image[xxi] so one cannot be certain of the plans He has for us. She also writes:

“Again, shall all things swarm with life, and the principle which divides animate from inanimate nature be still undiscovered, and yet no emanation from the essential deity, brood over the face of the deep, or breathe into man the breath of life?”[xxii].

In other words, life and what distinguishes animate and inanimate are currently unknown and depend on God. Nevertheless, I do not think this potentially sceptical approach towards unknowability makes Shepherd warrant the label of being a Skeptic. In addition, Shepherd mentions resurrection in her Essay X where she discusses how foetal consciousness apparently takes place and carries on into childhood and adulthood, despite us not having any consciousness or memory of it[xxiii]. In this way, Shepherd wishes to leave open the possibility of something similar taking place after death because she thinks it illustrates the possibility of a “dormant capacity unexcited…” that can “start into life, under modifications of appropriate interfering qualities”[xxiv]. More specifically, this may indicate that one could have a “life of the same mind anew” that could be “excited” after death, possibly in the form of resurrection or a related state[xxv].

Shepherd reinforces this claim by providing another analogy to illustrate her argument against the claim that an afterlife is not possible due to the “dispersion of particles …by death”[xxvi]. In response to this latter claim, she states her brief analogy that, just as a “worm” (perhaps we should visualize a caterpillar here) has the capacity to leave its outer layer behind yet carry on existing, so a human may have the capacity to enjoy some sort of existence after death despite not retaining all of his or her particles[xxvii]. She continues by painting the picture of an insect that spends all its life, from birth to death, on the same one leaf[xxviii]. This means that, the only sensory perceptual experiences that this insect can have is restricted to what it can encounter within the small world of that particular leaf. Nevertheless, things other than that one leaf do exist, despite the fact that they are unperceived by the insect. Hence, Shepherd uses this analogy to conclude that perceptual experience is not an accurate indication of what does and does not exist. Similarly, if philosophy only acknowledges sensory perceptions and experiences that arise during a human’s lifetime, it leaves one in a similar position to that of the insect who lives its entire life on the same leaf. In other words, the bounds of one’s experience need not encompass everything that may exist and so the possibility of an afterlife existing and possibly being a reality could be overlooked if one doesn’t place enough value on reasoning through one’s ideas and concepts about it. In this way, I would also be inclined to read Shepherd as again, like in her compass example earlier in this chapter, suggesting that inadequate ideas can be indicative of something that is potentially an adequate, true idea. This analogy of the insect further suggests that, much as one may only have inadequate ideas of a life beyond one’s immediate experience of the world, this does not mean that an existence beyond the world in which we live, or leaf on which the insect lives, is impossible. Hence, one cannot rule out the possibility that, like some insects have the capacity to fly off into “boundless space”[xxix] so humans may have the capacity to have an afterlife upon death which involves things that, although exist, could not be known to exist during our lifetime because the concepts are beyond our experiences in life. Therefore, I read Shepherd as suggesting that one should expect to have to keep an open mind about the possibility of the existence, reality and precise nature of an afterlife.

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[i] Mary Shepherd, Chapter I. On Continuous Existence. (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p36, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/13/mode/1up.

[ii] Shepherd, Chapter I. On Continuous Existence.

[iii] Shepherd.

[iv] Shepherd.

[v] Shepherd.

[vi] Shepherd.

[vii] Shepherd.

[viii] Mary Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/n7/mode/2up.

[ix] Shepherd.

[x] Shepherd.

[xi] Shepherd, Chapter I. On Continuous Existence., p37.

[xii] Shepherd, p37.

[xiii] Shepherd, p37.

[xiv] Shepherd, p37.

[xv] Shepherd, p37.

[xvi] Shepherd, p37.

[xvii] Shepherd, p38.

[xviii] Shepherd, p38.

[xix] Shepherd, p38.

[xx] Mary Shepherd, ‘Chapter VII. Application Of the Doctrine Contained In the Preceding Essay To the Evidence Of Our Belief In Several Opinions.’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p157, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/154/mode/2up.

[xxi] Shepherd, p157.

[xxii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation, p190.

[xxiii] Shepherd, p379.

[xxiv] Shepherd, p379-380.

[xxv] Shepherd, p380.

[xxvi] Shepherd, ‘Chapter VII. Application Of the Doctrine Contained In the Preceding Essay To the Evidence Of Our Belief In Several Opinions.’, p158.

[xxvii] Shepherd, p158-9.

[xxviii] Shepherd, p158-9.

[xxix] Shepherd, p159.

Shepherd vol 1 ebook chapter 9 Shepherd’s Rationalist Philosophical Framework

Chapter 9: Shepherd’s Rationalist Philosophical Framework 

In this chapter, I shall consider to what extent Shepherd[i], as Bolton[ii] describes her, displays a skeptical style of realism. I agree with Bolton[iii] that Shepherd is a realist and that she has some skeptical moments in her writings[iv]. I find this mainly to be the case when she rules out the possibility of knowledge concerning “the real essences of matter”[v]. Nevertheless, I hesitate to see Shepherd as a sceptical philosopher as such. So, I aim to retain the notion that Bolton[vi] offers that Shepherd was a realist. However, I shall further it by putting forward my reasons for why I interpret Shepherd as being, although less commonly for a British Philosopher, a through-going Rationalist. Hence, I suggest that Shepherd was a Rationalist, Realist philosopher who defended theist philosophy to the extent that she rejected scepticism as a general stance, despite having sceptical doubts about the possibility of knowing the fundamental essences of things.      

Firstly, Shepherd clearly supports a theist approach to philosophizing in her writings[vii]. She states that an important aspect of understanding her approach[viii] is that she thinks theist philosophers can plausibly “answer” atheistic problems posed in metaphysics and epistemology. Shepherd also constructs her stance within pure philosophy and does “not” wish “to arrange a system of theological philosophy, or to attempt an improvement of those stronger arguments in favour of Deity”[ix].

Hence, Shepherd’s theist philosophical framework consists in showing how the concept of God informs and clarifies metaphysics and epistemology, and vice versa, even down to our very thought processes, propositional beliefs and perceptions themselves:

“As to the existence of God, let it be remembered that all our belief concerning every proposition, is the result of what we conceive to be the consistent relations of ideas present in the mind. Now I have shown, that these relations force our minds to believe in continuous existences unperceived. It is upon similar premises that we build the foundation of our belief in Deity. For after some contemplation upon the phenomena of nature, we conclude, that in order to account for the facts we perceive, "there must needs be" one continuous existence, one uninterrupted essentially existing cause, one intelligent being, " ever ready to appear" as the renovating power for all the dependant effects, all the secondary causes beneath our view. To devout minds, this notion becomes familiar and clear; …”[x]

Secondly, this also shows that her approach to theist philosophy is a Rationalist approach. Shepherd’s[xi] view that relations of ideas support the existence of God, despite the fact that we are not able to perceive God through sensory perception, helps generate what I consider to be her Rationalist-style arguments both for the existence of God and about the continuous existence of objects and the self. Shepherd reinforces and furthers her argument that one can understand that God exists and is omnipotent even though God cannot be perceived through the senses in her chapter “Recapitulation”[xii]. One such example may be where she questions the value of giving perception as key a role as the Idealists often give it. She writes “for shall we limit the capacities and attributes of Divinity, in his unknown state, by our meagre perception?”[xiii]. I think that further textual evidence of Shepherd’s Rationalism can be found in her Essay XI, ‘On the Immateriality of Mind’[xiv] where she claims that God’s universal mind is known rationally and not by sensory experience given that He does not possess a body which would be detectable by the senses. 

“…the universal mind which must have executed these works is not united to any small defined body with which we can become acquainted by our senses; therefore it is a hidden mind, although we know of its existence, by means of reason.”[xv]

So, given the above passages, I consider Shepherd to be a theist, rationalist philosopher who argues against the way empiricism, and even Idealism, can restrict knowledge of unperceived existences. So, on Shepherd’s view[xvi] just because a notion exceeds one’s sensory and perceptual experience, such ideas are still within one’s rational capacity and understanding and she cross-applies this line of argument to the afterlife. I read Shepherd as deciding it is best to leave possibilities concerning life and death open because they rely on an omnipotent God who can act in ways beyond our experiences. I interpret her as saying this because it plausibly coheres with her claims in her following sentence: “Or finally, shall God be either limited, or divisible, by senses that cannot detect his presence, although known by the understanding that he “needs must exist”, and be in all times and places “ready to appear” to his creation, as the continually existing cause for its support, its life, its hope, its confidence, and its joy!” [xvii]. Here, Shepherd seems to be arguing that, placing a philosophical emphasis on sensory perception, and its role in determining what exists, is problematic for a concept of God since God exists but is imperceptible to the senses. So, it may be plausible that she constructs her philosophical arguments, and accepts or rejects other views, somewhat on the basis of whether it coheres with her concept of God and her view that He is “known by the understanding”[xviii] as opposed to the senses.

This, I suggest, means that Shepherd fits into the generally agreed description of the category of Rationalist philosopher[xix]. I think it is possible that Shepherd may somewhat hold a metaphysical version of “The Intuition/Deduction Thesis”, which is a Thesis which qualifies a philosopher as a Rationalist[xx]. For example, I think Shepherd[xxi] would assent to the view that some “metaphysical claims, such as that God exists” can be known a priori without involving sensory perception[xxii]. I would also like to put forward the suggestion that Shepherd[xxiii] supplements this with the additional Rationalist-style view that intuitive and deductive knowledge which arises from our innately rational nature, is knowledge that is not attainable through sensory perception[xxiv]. This is referred to as “The Indispensability of Reason thesis”[xxv] which I argue Shepherd[xxvi] can be seen to express in my above quotes.

Thirdly, I agree with Markie[xxvii] that it is important not to insist on an Early Modern philosopher being neatly categorised as either purely Rationalist or Empiricist. One application of this to Shepherd’s philosophy is by noticing that, despite the sceptical claim that “The real essences of matter and mind we know not ;”[xxviii] she goes on to acknowledge that sensory experience gives rise to knowledge and can restrict the bounds of what we can know about real essences. This can be seen when she goes on to write “we only know our sensations, as real beings, very essences: these are the very things themselves. We know of other things which must "needs exist" by our sensations, but cannot conceive the nature of any essence not in our experience.”[xxix]. In this way, not only does one become astute to Shepherd’s occasional concessions to empiricism, but it also highlights an example of a sceptical moment in her writings. However, unlike Bolton[xxx], I do not interpret Shepherd as a type of Skeptic philosopher because, no sooner has Shepherd strayed into what could be considered a sceptical claim about essences, she writes a strong disclaimer stating “I trust such ideas will not be thought tending to a dangerous scepticism”[xxxi]. Further textual evidence which shows Shepherd’s general rejection of a sceptical approach can be seen in the following passages:

  “The advantages resulting from this doctrine are…. that it admits of examining nature without scepticism”[xxxii]

And that scepticism can leave us “weakened” and should be overcome by reason, the only methodology which creates propositions in the first place and importantly leads to truth[xxxiii]:  

“A scepticism only to be corrected by the reflection, that it is not justified by reason”[xxxiv]

Fourthly, I agree with Bolton[xxxv] that Shepherd is a Realist and I think there is substantial textual evidence to support this. Realism is a view which holds that things exist independently of our minds and language[xxxvi]. One key passage which I suggest shows Shepherd’s realism is in her second chapter “On External Existence”[xxxvii] where she discusses how objects in the world which trigger our sense organs to detect them are external to and independent of our mind. The role our mind plays is mainly to register that we have sensed the object and that our mind gives us the capacity to remember, contemplate and reflect upon the object when it is no longer before us[xxxviii]. She asks and examines what the difference is between sensing or perceiving an object which is mind independent and outside of ourselves and an object which is within our minds, highlighting how it can be difficult to distinguish between the two but there is nevertheless an outer-ness and inner-ness to different objects of our perception[xxxix]. The key element of the question she poses is: “Whence is it that a judgment is formed by the mind, that some of its sensations or perceptions are exterior to, instead of included in the mind,…”[xl]. I interpret Shepherd’s answer to her own question as possibly amounting to a Realist-Rationalist claim that, through rational thought, it can be shown that objects in the external world are mind independent and exist in a manner which is outside of ourselves: “I answer as before, that by reason the mind judges that the causes of those sensations in particular, which come under the definition of external objects, must needs be out of, and distinct from the mind, or the cause of sensation in general”[xli].

A further example of Shepherd’s view that things, including time, exist independently of a person’s perception, is:

“Thus the existence of time, like every other existence in nature, is perceived by some quality it determines to the mind, but has not its whole existence merely in that individual perception. It is the existence of things, and therefore of time, which enables them to be perceived, not the perception of them which enables them to exist.”[xlii].

She argues this even though her view of the world clashes with what she states is considered the foundational notion that “in the perception of objects their existence is contained”[xliii]. She wishes to advocate instead that it is obvious that:

“The very words, perception of a thing, state a relation between two existences: whereas our modern philosophers consider one existence as created in that relation, which truly is a contradiction in terms”[xliv].

I also read Shepherd as possibly being a Realist about the existence of numbers, based on the following textual evidence: “The existence of the notion of four units is not more certain under the immediate consciousness of it, than all the relations that are included in that number”[xlv]. 

As for language, I read Shepherd as holding the realist view that objects exist independently of words we ascribe to them. In addition, on Shepherd’s account, words are classified as having an “inward existence” rather than existing in the external world independently of us, because we can create and ascribe names for things in any way we decide is fitting[xlvi]. Shepherd’s account of outwardness and inwardness culminates in her observation that these two distinctions between types of existences bear out in our experience of the world[xlvii]. She illustrates this with her practical example of drowning in water[xlviii]. Water is “capable of being useful or hurtful to us” through, for instance, its quality of being able to drown a person[xlix]. This is because, not only is the water external to us, but also the sensation of drowning is caused by something outside of ourselves and so it can cause harm and potentially take a person’s life[l]. Shepherd also maintains that, given that water may or may not cause drowning, the water and the quality of drowning exist independently of and externally from one another[li].      

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[i] Mary Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/n7/mode/2up.

[ii] M. Bolton, ‘Causality, Physical and Mathematical Induction: The Necessitarian and “skeptical” Theory of Lady Mary Shepherd’ (British Society for the History of Philosophy Annual Conference: Causation 1500-2000, University of York, 2008).

[iii] Bolton.

[iv] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[v] Shepherd, p244.

[vi] Bolton, ‘Causality, Physical and Mathematical Induction: The Necessitarian and “skeptical” Theory of Lady Mary Shepherd’.

[vii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[viii] Shepherd, p392.

[ix] Shepherd, p392.

[x] Mary Shepherd, ‘Chapter VII. Application Of the Doctrine Contained In the Preceding Essay To the Evidence Of Our Belief In Several Opinions.’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p151-2, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/154/mode/2up.

[xi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[xii] Shepherd, p190-1.

[xiii] Shepherd, p190.

[xiv] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[xv] Shepherd, p390.

[xvi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[xvii] Shepherd, 190–91.

[xviii] Shepherd, p191.

[xix] P. Markie, ‘Rationalism vs. Empiricism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (USA: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/.

[xx] Markie.

[xxi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[xxii] Markie, ‘Rationalism vs. Empiricism’.

[xxiii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[xxiv] Markie, ‘Rationalism vs. Empiricism’.

[xxv] Markie.

[xxvi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[xxvii] Markie, ‘Rationalism vs. Empiricism’.

[xxviii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation, p244.

[xxix] Shepherd, p244.

[xxx] Bolton, ‘Causality, Physical and Mathematical Induction: The Necessitarian and “skeptical” Theory of Lady Mary Shepherd’.

[xxxi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation, p244.

[xxxii] Shepherd, 263–64.

[xxxiii] Shepherd, p108.

[xxxiv] Shepherd, p108.

[xxxv] Bolton, ‘Causality, Physical and Mathematical Induction: The Necessitarian and “skeptical” Theory of Lady Mary Shepherd’.

[xxxvi] A. Miller, ‘Realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (USA: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Winter edition 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/realism.

[xxxvii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[xxxviii] Shepherd.

[xxxix] Shepherd.

[xl] Shepherd, p39.

[xli] Shepherd, p40.

[xlii] Shepherd, p28.

[xliii] Shepherd, p28.

[xliv] Shepherd, p28-9.

[xlv] Shepherd, p19.

[xlvi] Shepherd, p63-4.

[xlvii] Shepherd, p64-5.

[xlviii] Shepherd, p64-5.

[xlix] Shepherd, p64.

[l] Shepherd, p64.

[li] Shepherd, p64-5.