Shepherd vol 1 ebook chapter 11 Immortality and Eternity

Chapter 11: Immortality and Eternity

The notion of the possibility that our mind could continue in some way, either by returning to a simple state or by changing into another state, as discussed previously, impacts on Shepherd’s view of the immortality of the soul[i]. Hence, when Shepherd frames the question of what would happen to the soul upon death, she wishes to re-formulate the question. She considers the usual focus in philosophy, of whether the soul lives on after bodily decay, somewhat irrelevant and misplaced[ii]. Instead, Shepherd reconsiders the immortality of the soul in terms of whether our mind could have a future life so putting the focus on the mind’s capacities and states rather than whether the soul can exist autonomously of the corporal body[iii]. I base this on her following passage where she states:

“The proper question, therefore, concerning the immortality of the soul, is not whether it can survive the body as a continuous existence — for it must be eternally independant of any particular set of organs in past, as in future time. — But the inquiry should be, whether when the organs which are in relation to any individual capacity, undergo the change called death, if the continuing mental capacity become simple in its aptitudes again, or, whether it remain so far in an altered state by what it has gone through in the present life, that it continues as the result of that modification?”[iv]

Just prior to posing this question, Shepherd[v], argues against the materialist position by carefully disentangling conflations between mind and body in relation to sensation. Our “stream of conscious sensation” triggered by our sensory organs[vi] is intermittent, for instance, we are only aware of our existence when awake but, strictly speaking, not while we are asleep. However, since we do not go in and out of existence, there must be something more continuous that maintains our existence than that which our senses are detecting[vii]. This continuation comes from mind rather than bodily sense organs[viii]. Shepherd has a two pronged explanation of the role of mind resulting from this conclusion, both of which refute the materialistic, atheistic view of the non-existence of God and the eternity of the soul[ix].

In terms of our mind, she argues that, much as our sensations themselves may be intermittent, our capacity for sensation exists consistently, a capacity which she defines as mind[x]. Our individual mind is ever ready to communicate with our sense organs, as and when they relate sensations to our minds[xi]. This description, I think may be related to her prior account of brain function as being “the exponent of the powers of the soul”[xii]. She also describes the soul as being able to have “notions”[xiii] and “an idea (or conclusion from reasoning)”[xiv]. The soul even “perceives” “objects” such as a “coloured” “picture”[xv]. Nevertheless, she rejects that mind, which I read her as distinguishing from the brain, could consist of extended matter, given that matter is not sentient in an uniform way but perhaps depends on what latent capacities are activated by its surrounding circumstances[xvi]. To summarize, Shepherd describes a conflation between bodily senses and the mental capacity for sensation as being as mistaken as confusing “the hands of a watch that mark the hour” with “the essence of time” itself[xvii]. Hence, by not delineating between the senses and “the continuous power which must exist” self-sufficiently from the senses, materialists overlook the rational possibility of something which may be providing us with an eternal existence and essence, irrespective of any variations it may undergo[xviii]. Indeed, given her arguments she puts forward in her Essay X, Shepherd believes her observations and reasoning “demonstrates the essential eternity of all mind; it renders probable any given state of it, as connected with any after state in the relation of cause and effect; whether with or without the revival of memory”[xix]. Furthermore, “Our “capacity”, our “being”, the “subject matter for” our sensations during our lifetime, including our ability to be sensitive to a range of emotions, have an intellect and be capable of movement, could well be immortal in the grand scale of things[xx]. Given that a rational proof of what immortality would look like for certain is beyond the limits of human experience or intellect, Shepherd keeps an open mind as to whether our “individual consciousness of personality” would persist or not and whether, on the possible scenario that the mind persists in an altered, improved state, this would entail improved ethical behaviour, given that Shepherd notes that nature tends towards gradual improvement of the species[xxi].

For Shepherd, the same structure of logical demonstration that she uses earlier in her treatise (to show the existence of and behaviours of human minds) can also be adapted and used to show, through the use of reason, the necessary existence of the “eternal, continuous”, universal mind of God which she describes as “the infinite space for his residence”[xxii]. In terms of God’s universal mind and the role that it has to play in our continuing existence, Shepherd writes that it is the “powers in nature (flowing from that continuous Being the God of Nature,) which are capable of giving birth to that constant effect, the sense of continuous existence”[xxiii]. Shepherd considers the possible objection to her view (that the causation seems often intermittent) and she answers that it is rational to think that, at a more fundamental level than this, there is an “uninterrupted cause” which is “an independant capacity in nature” which accounts for “the complicate being self; which when conscious, could take notice of its existence, and when unconscious, (as in sound sleep) could exist independently of its own observation.”[xxiv]. This passage, I suggest, helps one understand Shepherd’s general views on personal identity in terms of persistence conditions for the existence of self. This is why she prioritises an “uninterrupted” “original cause” sustaining human life and personal identity rather than a persistence of identical “particles” preserving personal identity, both in this life and in a possible afterlife[xxv]. Shepherd goes towards a possible definition of personal identity when she concludes that what we think of as selfhood consists of a “continued existing capacity in nature, (unknown, unperceived,) fitted to revive when suspended in sleep, or otherwise”[xxvi]. In this way, I interpret Shepherd’s[xxvii] views on the afterlife and possible bodily resurrection as being continuous with her views on personal identity. She lessens the importance of a person comprising of the identical set of particles in favour of a person having a continuous mental capacity of sorts.  This mental capacity, for Shepherd, is immaterial, eternal and not perceivable. She also factors in our capacity to revive in a variety of ways, some we know about, such as after sleeping, and some we don’t have knowledge of, such as after death.

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[i] Mary Shepherd, ‘Essay X. On the Eternity of Mind’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/372/mode/1up/search/essay+x.

[ii] Shepherd.

[iii] Shepherd.

[iv] Shepherd, p378-9.

[v] Shepherd, ‘Essay X. On the Eternity of Mind’.

[vi] Shepherd, p374.

[vii] Mary Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/n7/mode/2up.

[viii] Shepherd, ‘Essay X. On the Eternity of Mind’.

[ix] Shepherd, p376.

[x] Shepherd, ‘Essay X. On the Eternity of Mind’.

[xi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[xii] Mary Shepherd, Chapter I. On Continuous Existence. (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p36, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/13/mode/1up.

[xiii] Shepherd, p33.

[xiv] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation, p59.

[xv] Shepherd, p260.

[xvi] Shepherd, ‘Essay X. On the Eternity of Mind’, p375.

[xvii] Shepherd, p376.

[xviii] Shepherd, p376.

[xix] Shepherd, p381.

[xx] Shepherd, p377.

[xxi] Shepherd, p378, 380.

[xxii] Mary Shepherd, ‘Essay XI. On the Immateriality of Mind’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p390, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/386/mode/1up/search/386.

[xxiii] Mary Shepherd, ‘Chapter VII. Application Of the Doctrine Contained In the Preceding Essay To the Evidence Of Our Belief In Several Opinions.’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p154, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/154/mode/2up.

[xxiv] Shepherd, p154-5.

[xxv] Shepherd, p154.

[xxvi] Shepherd, p153.

[xxvii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.