Chapter 9: Shepherd’s
Rationalist Philosophical Framework
In this chapter, I shall consider
to what extent Shepherd[i],
as Bolton[ii]
describes her, displays a skeptical style of realism. I agree with Bolton[iii]
that Shepherd is a realist and that she has some skeptical moments in her
writings[iv].
I find this mainly to be the case when she rules out the possibility of
knowledge concerning “the real essences of matter”[v].
Nevertheless, I hesitate to see Shepherd as a sceptical philosopher as such.
So, I aim to retain the notion that Bolton[vi]
offers that Shepherd was a realist. However, I shall further it by putting
forward my reasons for why I interpret Shepherd as being, although less
commonly for a British Philosopher, a through-going Rationalist. Hence, I
suggest that Shepherd was a Rationalist, Realist philosopher who defended
theist philosophy to the extent that she rejected scepticism as a general
stance, despite having sceptical doubts about the possibility of knowing the
fundamental essences of things.
Firstly, Shepherd clearly
supports a theist approach to philosophizing in her writings[vii].
She states that an important aspect of understanding her approach[viii]
is that she thinks theist philosophers can plausibly “answer” atheistic
problems posed in metaphysics and epistemology. Shepherd also constructs her
stance within pure philosophy and does “not” wish “to arrange a system of
theological philosophy, or to attempt an improvement of those stronger
arguments in favour of Deity”[ix].
Hence, Shepherd’s theist philosophical
framework consists in showing how the concept of God informs and clarifies
metaphysics and epistemology, and vice versa, even down to our very thought
processes, propositional beliefs and perceptions themselves:
“As to the existence of God, let
it be remembered that all our belief concerning every proposition, is the
result of what we conceive to be the consistent relations of ideas present in
the mind. Now I have shown, that these relations force our minds to believe in
continuous existences unperceived. It is upon similar premises that we build
the foundation of our belief in Deity. For after some contemplation upon the
phenomena of nature, we conclude, that in order to account for the facts we
perceive, "there must needs be" one continuous existence, one
uninterrupted essentially existing cause, one intelligent being, " ever
ready to appear" as the renovating power for all the dependant effects,
all the secondary causes beneath our view. To devout minds, this notion becomes
familiar and clear; …”[x]
Secondly, this also shows that
her approach to theist philosophy is a Rationalist approach. Shepherd’s[xi]
view that relations of ideas support the existence of God, despite the fact that
we are not able to perceive God through sensory perception, helps generate what
I consider to be her Rationalist-style arguments both for the existence of God
and about the continuous existence of objects and the self. Shepherd reinforces
and furthers her argument that one can understand that God exists and is
omnipotent even though God cannot be perceived through the senses in her
chapter “Recapitulation”[xii].
One such example may be where she questions the value of giving perception as
key a role as the Idealists often give it. She writes “for shall we limit the
capacities and attributes of Divinity, in his unknown state, by our meagre
perception?”[xiii].
I think that further textual evidence of Shepherd’s Rationalism can be found in
her Essay XI, ‘On the Immateriality of Mind’[xiv]
where she claims that God’s universal mind is known rationally and not by
sensory experience given that He does not possess a body which would be
detectable by the senses.
“…the universal mind which must
have executed these works is not united to any small defined body with which we
can become acquainted by our senses; therefore it is a hidden mind, although we
know of its existence, by means of reason.”[xv]
So, given the above passages, I
consider Shepherd to be a theist, rationalist philosopher who argues against
the way empiricism, and even Idealism, can restrict knowledge of unperceived
existences. So, on Shepherd’s view[xvi]
just because a notion exceeds one’s sensory and perceptual experience, such
ideas are still within one’s rational capacity and understanding and she
cross-applies this line of argument to the afterlife. I read Shepherd as
deciding it is best to leave possibilities concerning life and death open
because they rely on an omnipotent God who can act in ways beyond our
experiences. I interpret her as saying this because it plausibly coheres with her
claims in her following sentence: “Or finally, shall God be either limited, or
divisible, by senses that cannot detect his presence, although known by the
understanding that he “needs must exist”, and be in all times and places “ready
to appear” to his creation, as the continually existing cause for its support,
its life, its hope, its confidence, and its joy!” [xvii].
Here, Shepherd seems to be arguing that, placing a philosophical emphasis on
sensory perception, and its role in determining what exists, is problematic for
a concept of God since God exists but is imperceptible to the senses. So, it
may be plausible that she constructs her philosophical arguments, and accepts
or rejects other views, somewhat on the basis of whether it coheres with her
concept of God and her view that He is “known by the understanding”[xviii]
as opposed to the senses.
This, I suggest, means that
Shepherd fits into the generally agreed description of the category of
Rationalist philosopher[xix].
I think it is possible that Shepherd may somewhat hold a metaphysical version
of “The Intuition/Deduction Thesis”, which is a Thesis which qualifies a
philosopher as a Rationalist[xx].
For example, I think Shepherd[xxi]
would assent to the view that some “metaphysical claims, such as that God
exists” can be known a priori without involving sensory perception[xxii].
I would also like to put forward the suggestion that Shepherd[xxiii]
supplements this with the additional Rationalist-style view that intuitive and
deductive knowledge which arises from our innately rational nature, is
knowledge that is not attainable through sensory perception[xxiv].
This is referred to as “The Indispensability of Reason thesis”[xxv]
which I argue Shepherd[xxvi]
can be seen to express in my above quotes.
Thirdly, I agree with Markie[xxvii]
that it is important not to insist on an Early Modern philosopher being neatly
categorised as either purely Rationalist or Empiricist. One application of this
to Shepherd’s philosophy is by noticing that, despite the sceptical claim that
“The real essences of matter and mind we know not ;”[xxviii]
she goes on to acknowledge that sensory experience gives rise to knowledge and
can restrict the bounds of what we can know about real essences. This can be
seen when she goes on to write “we only know our sensations, as real beings, very essences: these are
the very things themselves. We know of other things which must "needs
exist" by our sensations, but cannot conceive the nature of any essence
not in our experience.”[xxix].
In this way, not only does one become astute to Shepherd’s occasional
concessions to empiricism, but it also highlights an example of a sceptical
moment in her writings. However, unlike Bolton[xxx],
I do not interpret Shepherd as a type of Skeptic philosopher because, no sooner
has Shepherd strayed into what could be considered a sceptical claim about
essences, she writes a strong disclaimer stating “I trust such ideas will not
be thought tending to a dangerous scepticism”[xxxi].
Further textual evidence which shows Shepherd’s general rejection of a
sceptical approach can be seen in the following passages:
“The advantages resulting from this doctrine are…. that it admits of
examining nature without scepticism”[xxxii]
And that scepticism can leave us
“weakened” and should be overcome by reason, the only methodology which creates
propositions in the first place and importantly leads to truth[xxxiii]:
Fourthly, I agree with Bolton[xxxv]
that Shepherd is a Realist and I think there is substantial textual evidence to
support this. Realism is a view which holds that things exist independently of
our minds and language[xxxvi].
One key passage which I suggest shows Shepherd’s realism is in her second
chapter “On External Existence”[xxxvii]
where she discusses how objects in the world which trigger our sense organs to
detect them are external to and independent of our mind. The role our mind
plays is mainly to register that we have sensed the object and that our mind
gives us the capacity to remember, contemplate and reflect upon the object when
it is no longer before us[xxxviii].
She asks and examines what the difference is between sensing or perceiving an
object which is mind independent and outside of ourselves and an object which
is within our minds, highlighting how it can be difficult to distinguish
between the two but there is nevertheless an outer-ness and inner-ness to
different objects of our perception[xxxix].
The key element of the question she poses is: “Whence is it that a judgment is
formed by the mind, that some of its sensations or perceptions are exterior to,
instead of included in the mind,…”[xl].
I interpret Shepherd’s answer to her own question as possibly amounting to a
Realist-Rationalist claim that, through rational thought, it can be shown that
objects in the external world are mind independent and exist in a manner which
is outside of ourselves: “I answer as before, that by reason the mind judges
that the causes of those sensations in particular, which come under the
definition of external objects, must needs be out of, and distinct from the
mind, or the cause of sensation in general”[xli].
A further example of Shepherd’s
view that things, including time, exist independently of a person’s perception,
is:
“Thus the existence of time, like every other existence in nature, is perceived by some quality it determines to the mind, but has not its whole existence merely in that individual perception. It is the existence of things, and therefore of time, which enables them to be perceived, not the perception of them which enables them to exist.”[xlii].
She argues this even though her view of the world clashes with what she states is considered the foundational notion that “in the perception of objects their existence is contained”[xliii]. She wishes to advocate instead that it is obvious that:
“The very words, perception of a thing, state a relation between two existences: whereas our modern philosophers consider one existence as created in that relation, which truly is a contradiction in terms”[xliv].
I also read Shepherd as possibly being a Realist about the existence of numbers, based on the following textual evidence: “The existence of the notion of four units is not more certain under the immediate consciousness of it, than all the relations that are included in that number”[xlv].
“Thus the existence of time, like every other existence in nature, is perceived by some quality it determines to the mind, but has not its whole existence merely in that individual perception. It is the existence of things, and therefore of time, which enables them to be perceived, not the perception of them which enables them to exist.”[xlii].
She argues this even though her view of the world clashes with what she states is considered the foundational notion that “in the perception of objects their existence is contained”[xliii]. She wishes to advocate instead that it is obvious that:
“The very words, perception of a thing, state a relation between two existences: whereas our modern philosophers consider one existence as created in that relation, which truly is a contradiction in terms”[xliv].
I also read Shepherd as possibly being a Realist about the existence of numbers, based on the following textual evidence: “The existence of the notion of four units is not more certain under the immediate consciousness of it, than all the relations that are included in that number”[xlv].
As for language, I read Shepherd
as holding the realist view that objects exist independently of words we
ascribe to them. In addition, on Shepherd’s account, words are classified as
having an “inward existence” rather than existing in the external world
independently of us, because we can create and ascribe names for things in any
way we decide is fitting[xlvi].
Shepherd’s account of outwardness and inwardness culminates in her observation
that these two distinctions between types of existences bear out in our
experience of the world[xlvii].
She illustrates this with her practical example of drowning in water[xlviii].
Water is “capable of being useful or hurtful to us” through, for instance, its
quality of being able to drown a person[xlix].
This is because, not only is the water external to us, but also the sensation
of drowning is caused by something outside of ourselves and so it can cause
harm and potentially take a person’s life[l].
Shepherd also maintains that, given that water may or may not cause drowning,
the water and the quality of drowning exist independently of and externally
from one another[li].
[i] Mary Shepherd, Essays on the
Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the
Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard
and Son., 1827), https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/n7/mode/2up.
[ii] M. Bolton, ‘Causality, Physical and
Mathematical Induction: The Necessitarian and “skeptical” Theory of Lady Mary
Shepherd’ (British Society for the History of Philosophy Annual Conference:
Causation 1500-2000, University of York, 2008).
[iii] Bolton.
[iv] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[v] Shepherd, p244.
[vi] Bolton, ‘Causality, Physical and
Mathematical Induction: The Necessitarian and “skeptical” Theory of Lady Mary
Shepherd’.
[vii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[viii]
Shepherd, p392.
[ix] Shepherd, p392.
[x] Mary Shepherd, ‘Chapter VII. Application
Of the Doctrine Contained In the Preceding Essay To the Evidence Of Our Belief
In Several Opinions.’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe
and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly,
London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p151-2,
https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/154/mode/2up.
[xi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[xii] Shepherd, p190-1.
[xiii]
Shepherd, p190.
[xiv] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[xv] Shepherd, p390.
[xvi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[xvii]
Shepherd, 190–91.
[xviii]
Shepherd, p191.
[xix] P. Markie, ‘Rationalism vs. Empiricism’, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (USA: Metaphysics Research Lab,
Stanford University, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/.
[xx] Markie.
[xxi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[xxii]
Markie, ‘Rationalism vs. Empiricism’.
[xxiii]
Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.
[xxiv]
Markie, ‘Rationalism vs. Empiricism’.
[xxv] Markie.
[xxvi]
Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[xxvii]
Markie, ‘Rationalism vs. Empiricism’.
[xxviii]
Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation, p244.
[xxix]
Shepherd, p244.
[xxx] Bolton, ‘Causality, Physical and
Mathematical Induction: The Necessitarian and “skeptical” Theory of Lady Mary
Shepherd’.
[xxxi]
Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation, p244.
[xxxii]
Shepherd, 263–64.
[xxxiii]
Shepherd, p108.
[xxxiv]
Shepherd, p108.
[xxxv]
Bolton, ‘Causality, Physical and
Mathematical Induction: The Necessitarian and “skeptical” Theory of Lady Mary
Shepherd’.
[xxxvi]
A. Miller, ‘Realism’, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (USA: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, Winter edition 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/realism.
[xxxvii]
Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[xxxviii]
Shepherd.
[xxxix]
Shepherd.
[xl] Shepherd, p39.
[xli] Shepherd, p40.
[xlii]
Shepherd, p28.
[xliii]
Shepherd, p28.
[xliv]
Shepherd, p28-9.
[xlv] Shepherd, p19.
[xlvi]
Shepherd, p63-4.
[xlvii]
Shepherd, p64-5.
[xlviii]
Shepherd, p64-5.
[xlix]
Shepherd, p64.
[l] Shepherd, p64.
[li] Shepherd, p64-5.
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