Shepherd vol 1 ebook chapter 10 Afterlife Arguments and Analogies

Chapter 10: Afterlife Arguments and Analogies 

Applying this approach to Shepherd’s treatise, I shall now examine her treatment of the topic of the afterlife. Shepherd puts forward her suggestion of the possibility of an afterlife with two main arguments by analogy and a further, supporting analogy of human foetal consciousness.

One analogy is her example of a captain of a ship travelling north, guided by a compass reading[i]. When a compass points north, it is merely indicating the direction of where north actually lies[ii]. The compass needle itself is not where north is geographically located[iii]. In this way, Shepherd shows by analogy that, although a compass needle does not show the precise pinpointed location of north, it does give one an idea in one’s mind of the general, possible location of north[iv]. This idea of north, although not very precise and detailed, is nevertheless, very useful and leads one accurately enough to be able to later refine and specify the exact location of north[v]. Hence, this initial indication giving rise to the idea of north, is logical and accurate enough to lead one to the truth about the more precise location of north. This is shown by the fact that, by using the compass needle reading as a guide, and trusting it will lead the ship in the desired direction, the captain does indeed find the location he or she had an idea of previously[vi]. With her compass analogy, Shepherd is, unusually and perhaps controversially, claiming that inadequate ideas should not be dismissed because, although currently only inadequate, they may lead one to an adequate idea in the future[vii]. In this way, inadequate ideas cannot be used as a means for disproving an argument outright.

This compass analogy parallels Shepherd’s argument for the possibility of an afterlife. Just as one can have an idea of north so, similarly, she notes that many people have an idea of the afterlife. Hence, Shepherd[viii] thinks it would be rash not to leave the possibility of an afterlife open in one’s philosophy since an idea in one’s mind may be good enough rational evidence and justification to argue that the afterlife potentially exists and is true and that one can rationally trust one’s ideas of it. She reminds the reader that one could only give the kind of adequate proof of the existence of an afterlife that is often demanded once one has actually reached the afterlife[ix]. Hence, in this life, it is impossible to provide a proof of the reality of an afterlife if one insists on certain knowledge based on sensory perception[x].

However, for Shepherd, this is setting the bar too high because our brains, which are thinking through the possibility of an afterlife, are too limited and so what brains can or cannot conceive of is somewhat irrelevant[xi]. Indeed, for Shepherd, reaching the state of an afterlife is not reliant on whether we use our brains or not[xii]. Objects can be real on the basis that the notion gives rise to happiness and hopefulness in ethical people[xiii]. Much as this may seem as though Shepherd is arguing for a weak criteria, such as the reality of an afterlife can be satisfied as long as the notion gives rise to happiness and hopefulness in ethical people[xiv], this is not the main thrust of her argument. Shepherd mainly supports the possibility of an afterlife with her refined definition of a notion. Contra Idealists, Shepherd reaches the conclusion that notions of unperceived existences, such as an afterlife, are possible via reason, which she categorizes as “a certain set of sensations”[xv]. She supports this with the argument that one has a notion of death, despite this state not giving rise to sensations[xvi]. Nevertheless, one can understand the meaning of the notion of death because one can grasp the notion via “negative ideas which stand as the signs of those ideas”[xvii]. Furthermore, the very act of distinguishing between perceivable and non-perceivable objects entails “predicating something concerning unperceived objects; and concerning our knowledge of them in their unperceived state”[xviii]. In this way, Shepherd points out the illogicality and self-contradiction of arguing that one cannot have notions or knowledge of unperceivable states because one is incapable of uttering this statement without already possessing a notion of and a certain amount of knowledge of the existence of unperceivable states or objects. Moreover, according to Shepherd, this knowledge of unperceivable states or objects comes from a type of sensation, namely, reflection[xix]. This means that, if one takes all types of sensations possible into account, then one can show that it is possible to gain knowledge of unperceived, continuous existences.

Shepherd also remains flexible about the possibility of resurrection or a similar state to resurrection in an afterlife[xx]. One religious reason for this is that humans were not present when God decided to make us in His image[xxi] so one cannot be certain of the plans He has for us. She also writes:

“Again, shall all things swarm with life, and the principle which divides animate from inanimate nature be still undiscovered, and yet no emanation from the essential deity, brood over the face of the deep, or breathe into man the breath of life?”[xxii].

In other words, life and what distinguishes animate and inanimate are currently unknown and depend on God. Nevertheless, I do not think this potentially sceptical approach towards unknowability makes Shepherd warrant the label of being a Skeptic. In addition, Shepherd mentions resurrection in her Essay X where she discusses how foetal consciousness apparently takes place and carries on into childhood and adulthood, despite us not having any consciousness or memory of it[xxiii]. In this way, Shepherd wishes to leave open the possibility of something similar taking place after death because she thinks it illustrates the possibility of a “dormant capacity unexcited…” that can “start into life, under modifications of appropriate interfering qualities”[xxiv]. More specifically, this may indicate that one could have a “life of the same mind anew” that could be “excited” after death, possibly in the form of resurrection or a related state[xxv].

Shepherd reinforces this claim by providing another analogy to illustrate her argument against the claim that an afterlife is not possible due to the “dispersion of particles …by death”[xxvi]. In response to this latter claim, she states her brief analogy that, just as a “worm” (perhaps we should visualize a caterpillar here) has the capacity to leave its outer layer behind yet carry on existing, so a human may have the capacity to enjoy some sort of existence after death despite not retaining all of his or her particles[xxvii]. She continues by painting the picture of an insect that spends all its life, from birth to death, on the same one leaf[xxviii]. This means that, the only sensory perceptual experiences that this insect can have is restricted to what it can encounter within the small world of that particular leaf. Nevertheless, things other than that one leaf do exist, despite the fact that they are unperceived by the insect. Hence, Shepherd uses this analogy to conclude that perceptual experience is not an accurate indication of what does and does not exist. Similarly, if philosophy only acknowledges sensory perceptions and experiences that arise during a human’s lifetime, it leaves one in a similar position to that of the insect who lives its entire life on the same leaf. In other words, the bounds of one’s experience need not encompass everything that may exist and so the possibility of an afterlife existing and possibly being a reality could be overlooked if one doesn’t place enough value on reasoning through one’s ideas and concepts about it. In this way, I would also be inclined to read Shepherd as again, like in her compass example earlier in this chapter, suggesting that inadequate ideas can be indicative of something that is potentially an adequate, true idea. This analogy of the insect further suggests that, much as one may only have inadequate ideas of a life beyond one’s immediate experience of the world, this does not mean that an existence beyond the world in which we live, or leaf on which the insect lives, is impossible. Hence, one cannot rule out the possibility that, like some insects have the capacity to fly off into “boundless space”[xxix] so humans may have the capacity to have an afterlife upon death which involves things that, although exist, could not be known to exist during our lifetime because the concepts are beyond our experiences in life. Therefore, I read Shepherd as suggesting that one should expect to have to keep an open mind about the possibility of the existence, reality and precise nature of an afterlife.

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[i] Mary Shepherd, Chapter I. On Continuous Existence. (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p36, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/13/mode/1up.

[ii] Shepherd, Chapter I. On Continuous Existence.

[iii] Shepherd.

[iv] Shepherd.

[v] Shepherd.

[vi] Shepherd.

[vii] Shepherd.

[viii] Mary Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/n7/mode/2up.

[ix] Shepherd.

[x] Shepherd.

[xi] Shepherd, Chapter I. On Continuous Existence., p37.

[xii] Shepherd, p37.

[xiii] Shepherd, p37.

[xiv] Shepherd, p37.

[xv] Shepherd, p37.

[xvi] Shepherd, p37.

[xvii] Shepherd, p38.

[xviii] Shepherd, p38.

[xix] Shepherd, p38.

[xx] Mary Shepherd, ‘Chapter VII. Application Of the Doctrine Contained In the Preceding Essay To the Evidence Of Our Belief In Several Opinions.’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p157, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/154/mode/2up.

[xxi] Shepherd, p157.

[xxii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation, p190.

[xxiii] Shepherd, p379.

[xxiv] Shepherd, p379-380.

[xxv] Shepherd, p380.

[xxvi] Shepherd, ‘Chapter VII. Application Of the Doctrine Contained In the Preceding Essay To the Evidence Of Our Belief In Several Opinions.’, p158.

[xxvii] Shepherd, p158-9.

[xxviii] Shepherd, p158-9.

[xxix] Shepherd, p159.