There are various different approaches to doing analytic philosophy, all of them valuable in their own way. In this chapter, I shall explore some features of analytic philosophy and how it relates to science. I will show how I think this sheds light on how to read Shepherd’s writings, without imposing my own methodological preferences onto her system of thought.
Lamarque and Olsen list features of analytic philosophy’s methodology[i]:
·
“the
prominent application of logic and conceptual analysis;
·
the
commitment to rational methods of argument;
·
the
emphasis on objectivity and truth;
·
the
predilection for spare, literal prose, eschewing overly rhetorical or
figurative language;
·
the felt
need to define terms and offer explicit formulation of thesis;
·
the
quasi-scientific dialectical method of hypothesis/counter-example/modification;
·
the
tendency to tackle narrowly defined problems, often working within on-going
debates”
They also list optional “presuppositions” alongside this[ii]:
·
“the
treatment of scientific progress as paradigmatic;
·
a
tendency towards ontological “parsimony”, realism about science, and
physicalism about mind;
·
the
belief that philosophical problems are in some sense timeless or universal, at
least not merely constructs of history and culture.”
A philosopher does not need to display all the above features to be
considered an analytic philosopher. So, even if one only agreed that a few of
these features were in her works, she could still be classified as an analytic
philosopher. However, I think all of the above features can be found in
Shepherd’s writing, except that she is not a physicalist in her concept of
mind. I argue that this such an incredibly high percentage of analytic features
contained within her philosophy that the possibility of her being the first
analytic philosopher should be seriously considered and possibly acknowledged
in mainstream history of philosophy. To have so many of these features threaded
throughout both of her two lengthy treatises is, I think, remarkable,
especially considering that her philosophical works were published in the early
part of the nineteenth century, and Frege, who is seen as the father of
analytic philosophy, wasn’t even born until 1848.
I maintain her arguments are in a style of analytic philosophy, a style
which prioritizes being explicitly logically structured, ahistorical and not grounded in literary, cultural or theological concepts. As I shall explain
in chapters 3 and 4, Shepherd is frequently examining the argument structure of
other philosophers. She evaluates their arguments and definitions at length assessing
how logically they are constructed. I also explain how she takes the time to
clarify her own approach to analyzing concepts, definitions and framing her
theses and arguments. I also give examples of how she makes explicit what rules
of reasoning and logical methodology she advocates.
I argue that Shepherd’s authorial voice throughout both her treatises[iii],[iv]
also suits this description of philosophizing. She does write very literally,
plainly and technically without having a literary style to her argumentation.
All her arguments come across as having a keen desire to be objective and reach
the truth, no matter how apparently obscure the subject matter. She does not
rely on historical or cultural reasons for her arguments but provides abstract
metaphysical, logical and epistemological reasons for her claims which her
readers, irrespective of their era, can appreciate in a timeless and universal
sense. As I will explore in chapter 9, Shepherd is a Realist philosopher.
However, I think one can expect her Realism to look a little different from the
contemporary description of it above, given that she is mostly addressing
seventeenth to early nineteenth century philosophy with only the general
knowledge available to her at the time.
In addition, she displays other features which some analytic philosophers
opt for, such as keeping to a tight focus, structure and debate within each of
her treatises, as well as analyzing “features which are central and
characteristic”[v] of her
chosen philosophical problems. Her philosophical arguments are “slow,
meticulous” and she aims to provide “strong arguments to support precise,
clearly defined theses”[vi].
Shepherd also furthers philosophical discussion in accordance with the
“familiar analytic mode” of putting forward her stance by comparing and
contrasting her views with other philosophers, criticizing where necessary, so
she thereby “enters into a dialogue with other contributors”[vii].
Furthermore, I think Shepherd’s style of analytic philosophy suits the
technical metaphysics she wants to examine and makes her metaphysics stronger
because she has kept scientific possibilities in mind when considering
metaphysical possibility, as far as it was possible to do so in her era. Shepherd
does use rules of argumentation described in logic and she mentions logical
rules. This abstract, logical methodology, I suggest, crosses-over into resembling
the logic of science. In this way, I suggest she makes use of a
quasi-scientific dialectical methodology, although this is more varied than
only relying on counter-examples as a way of adjusting a hypothesis. I think we
also need to bear in mind that scientific dialectic in her era had a somewhat
different style from that which is used these days. By and large, there were less
strong demarcations between different disciplines and thinkers commonly took an
interest in and wrote on a wide variety of disciples. So abstract thought in
general, as well as areas in philosophy, logic and science were a lot more
fluid than is common today and any given individual moved freely between topics
as and when they felt it relevant. For instance, as I explored in the last chapter,
Babbage was interested in the sciences and mathematics but this also led him to
begin the foundations of computer science (before it became a science in
itself) and to write about philosophy, including about miracles. As I mentioned
in the previous chapter, Babbage was also fascinated with Astronomy and Shepherd
enjoyed meeting friends from the Astronomical Society he helped set up.
So for the rest of this chapter, I shall explore how developments in
contemporary astronomy can help us appreciate and value the analytical,
logical, quasi-scientific methodology found in Shepherd’s writings. I aim to
show that her analytic-logic of science methodology can somewhat link with
the scientific method behind discoveries today, giving her contemporary
relevance for many fields of study. To do this, I shall narrow my focus to two
of Shepherd’s analogies for the topic of the afterlife in her second treatise[viii],
an aspect of her philosophy I expand on in part 3.
Classic, timeless concepts analysed in
metaphysics, which fall under the subject matter of universals and particulars,
include questions such as “On what grounds do we say that the butterfly that
emerges from a cocoon is one and the same animal as the caterpillar that spun
the cocoon?” and “are there some changes a person could undergo, after which
what remains would no longer be a person?”[ix].
Shepherd raises this very question through her analogy of a bug on a leaf by
pointing out how a “worm” sheds its outer layer which “wholly perishes” while
the worm lives on as a seemingly different insect which can fly around in
“boundless space”[x].
This explores the metaphysical topics of continuous existence and whether dying
means we go out of existence or if we continue to exist in some way, for
instance, in an afterlife and how this relates to personal identity, eternity
and immortality.
Shepherd uses this analogy to serve
many purposes. One purpose is to provide an intuitive counterexample to those
who argue against the possibility of an afterlife on the basis that dispersion
of particles entails death[xi].
As we saw earlier in this chapter, this is in line with analytic philosophy
which makes use of counterexamples. A further purpose is a methodological one.
This analogy illustrates the restrictions involved in being too empiricist. The
empiricist can end up being like the bug on the leaf who, by reasoning from its
restricted life experience to date, wrongly concludes it will die when it sheds
its outer layer and will never know a life beyond what it experiences now. This
demonstrates the advantages of Shepherd’s Rationalist, analytic approach of
hypothesising rationally and logically beyond what experience has so-far
confirmed. The bug would have discovered a theory closer to the truth had it
used different methodological thinking. I maintain that this methodological
style is more quasi-scientific than it first appears. There are many big
questions still unanswered in science about what exists, not just in relation
to life and death but what exists in our universe generally. This is where the
logic of science comes into its own. There are times in science when it is more
productive to logically move from hypothesis to observation to help us make a
discovery.
One such example[xii]
is the Planet Nine theory which, I suggest, is akin to her bug on the leaf
analogy. In 2016, a team of science researchers discovered empirical evidence
which supported their hypothesis of why the sun tilts[xiii].
This means that they reasoned logically about how Planet Nine impacts on things
around it in the solar system first rather than start with an empirical
observation of the sun and Planet Nine[xiv].
This helped them make a discovery faster and more efficiently about something
which is very difficult to observe. Indeed, here we see how scientific theory
started with the concept of an hypothetical planet, called Planet Nine and then went about looking for empirical evidence to support the hypothesis[xv].
Empirical evidence did eventually support the existence of the hypothesised
planet, although scientists have struggled to find the exact location of it. So
similarly, Shepherd talks about the afterlife not as something to be
empirically proven initially but to be logically and rationally explored first.
So I think her example of a bug’s empirical experiences being restricted to its
leaf, making it ignorant of the possibilities beyond what its senses discover,
is relevant to situations in scientific discovery too. Had these scientists
restricted their thinking to only directly observable phenomenon rather than
working through various logical possibilities about the cosmos, they may never
have hit upon the best explanation.
Shepherd’s approach to metaphysics and
scientific method (of rationalising through a topic as far as our minds will go
before expecting any empirical evidence to confirm it, as well as the
usefulness of rough ideas for initially guiding us to the truth) is explicitly seen
in the way Batygin describes the discovery process[xvi].
First there was reasoning about possibilities, resulting in more than one
theory. This can be seen when Batygin states “I actually had theorized this in
2012 and wrote about it and the theory was almost exactly the same, except for
it wasn’t Planet Nine doing the torqueing but a companion star.”[xvii]
Shepherd[xviii]
also provides more than one possible explanation, leaving open which may be
closest to the truth about the afterlife. This open-mindedness is also useful
in science where hypothetical theories try to resolve tensions about a
phenomena. This can be seen when Batygin describes the puzzle of the tilting
sun and the latest theory: “It does help us understand planet formation because
planet formation theory dictates that all things must start out co-planar, in
the same plane. The fact that the Sun is tilted with respect to the rest of the
solar system is almost a violation of that very fundamental principle, so
understanding what’s going on there is important.”[xix]
So, I think Shepherd outlines an
analytic philosophical approach which suits scientific methodology and
discovery. This is interesting because it would be easy to assume that an
empiricist would match up with science better than a rationalist. However, as
can be seen here, scientists often work from hypothesis to observation rather
than invariably working the other way round. Hence, I think Shepherd’s logical
and rational analysis of things that are not fully comprehended about the world
and human life is not only fascinating within the history of philosophy but is
a relevant approach for modern science today.
Another recent scientific
discovery which, I think, sheds light on Shepherd’s philosophical methodology,
is supermassive black holes. Although it also applies to the bug on the leaf
analogy, here I will focus on the compass analogy.
In Shepherd’s analogy, the
captain makes use of available equipment, in this case a compass, to track the
orientation of the ship in relation to the location of north[xx].
This provides compass readings which we use to turn an inadequate (rough) idea
of where north is into a geographical reality[xxi].
Planet 9 shows how
ground-breaking scientific discoveries often consist of a bold, theoretical
hypothesis based on meticulous rational reasoning and explanation which can be
so accurate that it can be later proved with observation. This rationalistic
approach also applies to the discovery that supermassive black holes can orbit
each other after galaxies join up together[xxii].
Professor Taylor[xxiii],
who was involved with the project, describes how the discovery took place and
the role of theorizing:
“For a long time, we've been
looking into space to try and find a pair of these supermassive black holes
orbiting as a result of two galaxies merging.”[xxiv]
“Even though we've theorized that
this should be happening, nobody had ever seen it until now."[xxv]
Similarly, the astronomers
examined radio signal readings from radio telescopes to track the “trajectory”
and orbiting motions of the supermassive black holes[xxvi].
This not only leads to more adequate (clear) ideas about how supermassive black
holes orbit and why, but it could also provide us with possible knowledge of
what our galaxy could be like in the future[xxvii].
So I think Shepherd is right to see her approach to the afterlife as rigorous
enough to lead to good enough ideas for now which may be somewhat substantiated
in the future and lead to refined adequate ideas about the afterlife.
Perhaps it is easier to see the
value of such hypotheses these days, because recent technological progress has
enabled us to better test seemingly far-fetched hypotheses to check if they
correlate with observable reality. Taylor[xxviii]
admits that technology has played an important role in providing
sufficiently detailed data which provided the empirical evidence. Indeed, it
was as recently as 2016 that researchers could provide empirical evidence to
prove Einstein’s theory of the existence of gravitational waves, one hundred
years after he hypothesised it[xxix].
Now our picture of gravitational waves and how the universe works is coming
together between these two recent discoveries. From Einstein’s theory of
gravitational waves a century ago, we are now gaining an understanding of how
some types of black holes crash into each other and combine which, like stones
thrown into water, give rise to a ripple effect through space-time, known as
gravitational waves[xxx].
So I suggest this is perhaps what Shepherd was aiming for when she theorised
possibilities about the afterlife, given she hopes to “throw light upon this
subject, hitherto supposed to lie beyond the reach of human discovery” and
wishes that “a scientific knowledge of its principles be obtained”[xxxi].
[i] Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen,
eds., ‘General Introduction’, in ‘Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The
Analytic Tradition: An Anthology’, Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies
(Wiley-Blackwell, Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p2.
[ii] Lamarque and Olsen, p2.
[iii] Mary Shepherd, An Essay upon the
Relation of Cause and Effect : Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume,
Concerning the Nature of That Relation, with Observations upon the Opinions of
Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence Connected with the Same Subject (London, United
Kingdom: Printed for T. Hookham, 1824),
https://archive.org/stream/essayuponrelatio00shepiala#page/n7/mode/2up.
[iv] Mary Shepherd, Essays on the
Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the
Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard
and Son., 1827), https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/n7/mode/2up.
[v] Lamarque and Olsen, ‘General
Introduction’, p5.
[vi] Lamarque and Olsen, p5.
[vii] Lamarque and Olsen, p5.
[viii]
Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[ix] S. Gorovitz and R. G. Williams, Philosophical
Analysis: An Introduction to Its Language & Techniques, 2nd edition
(New York, USA: Random House, 1969), p136.
[x] Mary Shepherd, ‘Chapter VII. Application
Of the Doctrine Contained In the Preceding Essay To the Evidence Of Our Belief
In Several Opinions. Section III. Observations on the Essential Difference
between Body and Mind.’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe
and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly,
London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), p158-9,
https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/154/mode/2up.
[xi] Shepherd, p158.
[xii] Liba Kaucky, ‘Planet 9 and the Bug on the
Leaf’, The Lady Mary Shepherd Salon (blog), 27 May 2017,
https://theladymaryshepherdphilosophysalon.blogspot.co.uk/2017/05/planet-9-and-bug-on-leaf.html.
[xiii]
S. Stirone, ‘Planet Nine May Be
Responsible for Tilting the Sun: How Our Possible Rogue Planet May Be Messing
with Our Solar System’, Astronomy Magazine, 19 October 2016,
http://www.astronomy.com/news/2016/10/planet-nine-tilting-the-sun.
[xiv] Stirone.
[xv] Stirone.
[xvi] Stirone.
[xvii]
Stirone.
[xviii]
Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of
an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation.
[xix] Stirone, ‘Planet Nine May Be Responsible
for Tilting the Sun: How Our Possible Rogue Planet May Be Messing with Our
Solar System’.
[xx] Mary Shepherd, Chapter I. On
Continuous Existence. (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard
and Son., 1827), p36,
https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/13/mode/1up.
[xxi] Shepherd, p36.
[xxii]
Anon., ‘Groundbreaking Discovery Confirms
Existence of Orbiting Supermassive Black Holes’, educational, EurekAlert: The
global Source for Science News, 27 June 2017,
https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2017-06/uonm-gdc062617.php.
[xxiii]
Anon.,.
[xxiv]
Anon.,.
[xxv] Anon.,.
[xxvi]
Anon.,.
[xxvii]
Anon.,.
[xxviii]
Anon.,.
[xxix]
Anon.,.
[xxx] Anon.,.
[xxxi]
Mary Shepherd, ‘Essay VI, That Sensible
Qualities Cannot Be Causes-against Mr. Hume.’, in Essays on the Perception
of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of
Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son.,
1827), p308,
https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/296/mode/1up/search/essay+VI.
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