In this chapter, I shall examine
the content and structure of Hume’s argument against miracles and attempt to
provide an interpretation based on close textual evidence in part one
of his essay X “Of Miracles” in his Enquiry[i].
I shall focus on part one of Hume’s essay because I want to bring out the
maxims and principles he sets out here that structure his argument against
miracles and culminate in his doctrine against miracles, which is the focus of
Shepherd’s criticisms.
Hume commences Of Miracles with a
reference to Dr Tillotson (EHU 10.86; SBN 109). His influence on his argument
against miracles has been debated. My understanding from the Enquiry (1777) is
that Hume does draw inspiration from Dr Tillotson because he writes “I have
discovered an argument of like nature” (EHU 10.86 SBN 110). Hume states his aim
for doing so is to “silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and
free us” and to help prevent “all kinds of superstitious delusion” which
invariably occur in all centuries (EHU 10.86 SBN 110).
Then Hume (EHU 10.87; SBN 110)
begins his argument against miracles by setting out his methodological
principles, describing what constitutes sound reasoning from experience and
available evidence, in order to be able to obtain true facts. So, on Hume’s
view, the best way to avoid holding mistaken beliefs is to adjust one’s “degree
of assurance” (EHU 10.87; SBN 110) in a belief according to whether the
empirical evidence shows a constant conjunction between an effect and a cause
or whether the evidence is inconsistent across various experiments. (Here I
think it is worth keeping in mind the following important point raised by
Bennett in his editorial explanations on Hume’s 1748 edition of his Enquiry to
preserve Hume’s original meanings as far as possible by being consciously aware
of language usage in his era: “In Hume’s day, an ‘experiment’ didn’t have to be
something deliberately contrived to test some hypothesis. An ‘experiment’ that
you have observed may be just an experience that you have had and attended to.”[ii])
The former provides a “proof” while the latter results in a “probability”
according to our “past experience” (EHU 10.88; SBN 112). I suggest Hume’s
discussion on induction and probability based on prior experience could inform
this passage in Hume’s Enquiry. Contemporary philosophical discussions on what
constitutes good evidence and philosophical disagreement I think are
interesting to consider in light of Hume’s Enquiry too.
In addition, Hume attempts to
accommodate objections to his principles of reason being heavily based on
experience and empirical evidence by explaining that it is not experience
itself which is at fault when it seems to lead people into error. Instead, what
often leads to error are factors such as a lack of considering enough variety
of experiments, or not acknowledging that evidence-based belief can only
indicate probabilities, or not knowing how to calculate what constitutes
“superior evidence” (EHU 10.87; SBN 111). Furthermore, Hume (EHU 10.88; SBN
112) considers the gold standard for forming judgements and resolving
disagreements to consist of a combination of numerous and careful observations
with past experience. These methodological principles lay the ground for Hume’s
views on testimony because he categorises testimony as a “species of reasoning”
(EHU 10.88; SBN 111). Realising that it is contested whether testimony, like
other types of reasoning, is based on causes and effects, he narrows his focus
to the relation between facts and testimony and “observation of” true testimony
(EHU 10.88; SBN 111). Hume (EHU 10.88; SBN 111) then highlights his “general
maxim” that connections between two things or events are not concrete,
discoverable things in the world but, rather, they are logical “inferences”
that arise from experience and he applies this maxim to testimony. So, Hume
outlines how best to form judgements under various testimonial circumstances.
For instance, if there are inconsistencies within, between or surrounding testimonial accounts which detail
observations and experiences then we should weigh up all the evidence provided
and base our final judgment on “a superiority” discovered which defeats the
other possible readings of the situation (EHU 10.88; SBN 112). Given that this
judgment is based on the best evidence and argument available, it is advisable
to grant this belief less assurance than had it been founded on “uniform”
“experience” (EHU 10.88; SBN 112). Hume also lists additional factors which may
influence the authority of the testimony itself as well as the force of the
argument supporting the testimony (EHU 10.89; SBN 112-13). The authority we
attribute to testimonial accounts, for Hume (EHU 10.88; SBN 112), relies on his
general account of human nature which views people’s nature rather positively
and assumes they tend towards the truth and that those who are of a vicious
nature and prone to lies lose their epistemic authority as a result. Nevertheless,
Hume recognises that people routinely have reservations concerning the
testimonial accounts of others (EHU 10.88; SBN 112). Hence, in his assessment
of the credibility of a reported miracle, Hume takes into account factors such
as whether the testifier had ulterior motives, together with the nature of
their speech acts and behaviour when they are testifying (EHU 10.89; SBN
112-3).
Armed with the above
methodological principles, general maxim, view of human nature and an
explanation of how testimony fits into this, Hume goes on to construct his
refutation of miracles. First he applies his aforementioned explanation of
testimony together with his “principle of experience” to testimony which, this
time, recounts and attempts to “establish” “the extraordinary and the
marvellous” (EHU 10.89; SBN 113). Given his general account of how to form
judgements about testimony, he concludes that, due to the uncommonly observed
facts put forward as evidence, this evidence correspondingly has greater or
lesser force depending on the degree to which the facts are “unusual” (EHU
10.89; SBN 113). In this way, the contrasting experiences go head to head and
the “superior” wins out (EHU 10.89; SBN 113). Hume also uses his “principle of
experience” as a basis for what level of “degree of assurance” we should have
in relation to the testimony and fact (EHU 10.89; SBN 113). Contradictions
discovered within testimony and fact also impact on the credibility and
“authority” of the account and the beliefs we are prepared to hold about it
(EHU 10.89; SBN 113). Hume supports this claim with the Roman notion that the
authority of testimony can end up void if the facts that we are required to
believe seem too far-fetched (EHU 10.89; SBN 113). This is because we grant
plausibility on the basis that we are “accustomed to find conformity between”
“testimony and reality” (EHU 10.89; SBN 113). Since this is perceived a
posteriori rather than a priori, Hume claims that when events recounted are at
odds with “uniform experience”, then they are not believed, no matter how sound
the a priori reasoning is behind the testimony (EHU 10.89; SBN 113-4). Hume
reinforces his common sense theory here by citing the example of the Indian
Prince who disbelieved the occurrence of frost because it was out of his
experience and so any testimony to dissuade him would need to be especially forceful
(EHU 10.89; SBN 113-4).
Hume’s second step is to tweak
this scenario further by substituting a “marvellous” event for a “miraculous”
event, together with putting forward the assumption that the testimony in this
case constitutes “an entire proof”, with the aim of raising the level of
improbability against the testimonial accounts (EHU 10.90; SBN 114). Thus, Hume
sets out his doctrine consisting of an “argument from experience” which
attempts to conclusively and logically refute that miracles occur (EHU 10.90;
SBN 114). Hume defines a miracle in the following ways:
“A miracle is a violation of the
laws of nature” (EHU 10.90; SBN 114).
“A miracle may be accurately defined,
a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by
the interposition of some invisible agent. A miracle may either be discoverable
by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house
or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the
wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose, is as real a
miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us” (EHU 10 footnote 1; SBN
115).
Furthermore, as part of my
interpretation of Hume on miracles, I would now like to examine the underlying
structure of Hume’s doctrine against miracles by suggesting that his definition
of a miracle could be read as what Gupta[iii]
describes in logic as an “intensionally” adequate descriptive definition. This
means that it is a definition with no possible counterexamples and which aims
to describe the meaning of a word or sentence in a way which coheres with
agreed usage[iv].
Textual support for my view is that Hume explicitly wishes to write about the
meaning of miracles in accordance with how miracles are “esteemed” or
“denominated” by people (EHU 10.90; SBN 115 and EHU 10 footnote 1; SBN 115).
Indeed, Hume also defines a
miracle by stating the opposite to show what people think it is not:
“Nothing is esteemed a miracle,
if it ever happened in the common course of nature.” (EHU 10.90; SBN 115).
Moreover, Hume argues again from
agreed usage that:
“There must, therefore, be a
uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would
not merit that appellation” (EHU 10.90; SBN 115).
Here, Hume combines usage with
practical examples of why people are right in agreeing on this definition of
miracles by showing how it fits with our understanding of observation and experience.
For instance, a miracle does not merely refer to an “unusual” event which
nevertheless has a precedence of past observations, such as an unexpected death
of a healthy person (EHU 10.90; SBN 115). However, were that person to revive
after death that would constitute a miracle in virtue of the absence of any
prior observations of this phenomenon (EHU 10.90; SBN 115).
Hence, my interpretation of
Hume’s views on miracles is that this “intensionally” adequate descriptive
definition[v]
forms an important part of the structure of Hume’s argumentation about
miracles. I would like to further examine the structure of his argument by
putting forward the possibility that Hume’s attempted refutation of miracles
was designed to be “a proof” that could not “be destroyed” (EHU 10.90; SBN 115)
by framing his argument within a logical framework. I suggest this framework
could be seen as the type of logical argument which retains the validity of its
inferences from its true premises to ensure a true and sound conclusion[vi].
Generically, the structure of this type of logical argument is:
I suggest that perhaps Hume’s
(EHU 10.90; SBN 114-5) counterargument against miracles could be placed within
this logical framework in the following way:
Premise 1 If a full proof is
provided, then it conforms to our uniform experience and the natural laws which
arise from it
Premise 2 But miracles (defined
as a violation of nature law) don’t conform to our uniform experience and these
natural laws
Conclusion So miracles don’t
provide a full proof (and thereby are disproved by definition)
Within this argument, Hume is
asking us to assume that uniform experience provides “a direct and full proof”
of, and the truth of, the testimony about the event (EHU 10.90; SBN 115). He is
working here with his most basic definition of miracles as being, by
definition, “a violation of the laws of nature” (EHU 10.90; SBN 114)
established by our “uniform experience” (EHU 10.90; SBN 115) and observation of
them. This leads Hume to argue that a full proof against the existence of
miracles is conclusively implied by the very definition of a miracle itself
(EHU 10.90; SBN 114-5). Therefore, Hume reasons that, on balance, the proof
against miracles is stronger than the proof for them (EHU 10.90; SBN 115).
Hence, Hume concludes by setting out his “general maxim” that testimony cannot
provide a sufficient condition for proving that a miracle took place (EHU
10.91; SBN 115-6). This is then supplemented by adding the additional
consideration that, in the hypothetical event of two miracles being reported,
the lesser miracle is to be believed over the “greater miracle” because “the
falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he
relates” (EHU 10.91; SBN 116). It is the only hypothetical scenario in which
Hume professes that he would perhaps somewhat assent to the idea that a miracle
had taken place and thereby hold a “belief or opinion” in favour of that
miracle existing (EHU 10.91; SBN 116). However, this remains hypothetical
because Hume promptly deems this approach to be too generous (EHU 10.92; SBN
116).
[i] David Hume, ‘Section X, “Of Miracles”’,
in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of
Morals, ed. Selby-Bigge and Nidditch, 3rd edition (Oxford Clarendon Press,
1975).
[ii] David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human
Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Jonathan Bennett
(Canada, 2004), 56, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/hume1748.pdf.
[iii] Anil Gupta, ‘Definitions’, ed. Edward N.
Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (USA: Metaphysics
Research Lab, Stanford University, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/definitions/.
[iv] Gupta.
[v] Gupta.
[vi] Paul Pietroski, ‘Logical Form’, ed.
Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (USA:
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/logical-form/.
[vii] Pietroski.
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