Shepherd vol 1 ebook chapter 4 (Arguing Against Circularity)

Chapter 4: Shepherd Arguing Against Circularity in her Treatises

I think there are good grounds for my argument that Shepherd is highly aware of what is and isn’t circular or begging the question.

In her first treatise, Shepherd provides us with pertinent examples of philosophers’ reasoning which she maintains argues in a circle:

“Now this method of placing the argument is but the statement of another circle; for causation is used as the very principle which lies at the foundation of the whole system; and afterwards we are desired to search for the impression, which is the CAUSE of that EFFECT, viz. the idea causation.”^[i]

In other words, Shepherd thinks that Hume is arguing in a circle because he is already using one and the same idea (causation) both as a foundational principle in his system of thought whilst also being in the process of examining this idea (of causation through talking about an aspect of causation, namely impressions which cause effects). This would constitute a larger circle but a circle nonetheless because, by examining impressions, it is easy to forget that he may be categorising them as a type of causation. So he is not recycling the same words but he may be recycling the same idea of causation. In addition, she argues that Hume reuses the same proposition in his arguments about causation, which she considers a lack “of logical precision”^[ii]:

“Such a notion ends in the formation of a mere identical proposition; viz. a certain association of ideas is causation; and causation consists in an association of ideas.”^[iii]

Another example she gives in this first treatise not only shows us another example of what she thinks constitutes arguing in a circle but also relates to her views on laws of nature and miracles in her second treatise:

“Now shortly the whole of this reasoning concerning the possibility of nature altering her course, is but a circle! for the argument is invented to show that CUSTOM not REASON, must be the only ground of our belief in the relation of Cause and Effect. But it is impossible to imagine such a change in nature, unless reason were previously excluded as the principle of that relation; and it is impossible to exclude reason as the principle of that relation, except by supposing that nature may alter her course. Thus the idea of causation, is founded only on experience, experience is supplied with arguments by custom not by reason and custom is supported in her authority by a supposed change in nature, impossible to any idea of causation, Unless ALREADY SUPPOSED TO BE MERELY THE EFFECT OF CUSTOM”^[iv]

Here, her objection amounts to the observation that there are implicit, unstated assumptions about nature changing course and custom which is used to help him prove his argument and is re-used in his conclusion. By adding in these implicit assumptions, she can sketch the elongated circular structure of Hume’s argument. Again, Shepherd is showing great depth of knowledge about how an argument inadvertently ends up circular. Her view that Hume suffers from circularity seems to also be shared by Dr. Brown whose demonstration of Hume’s circularity she commends^[v].  She strikes me as quite scathing of such errors, perhaps because she sees circular argumentation as an attempt to unfairly convince the unsuspecting reader by misleading them with “sophism”^[vi].

There is some further textual evidence in both her treatises from which we can garner specific information on how Shepherd thought a philosopher can avoid a circular argument.

In Shepherd’s second treatise, there is a passage in her essay ‘Of Miracles’ which shows us how she checks for and avoids circularity:

“First, It is objected, "That to say, the doctrine proves the miracles, and that the miracles prove the doctrine, is to argue in A CIRCLE.

To this objection I would simply reply, that it possesses no force, when the questions to which it relates, are properly distinguished in their conception, and separated in their statements.”^[vii]

…. “When these two latter questions are answered in the affirmative, no illogical answer in a circle is given to them, as any one may plainly perceive, however little skilled in the technical rules of reasoning.”^[viii]

In this passage, I think, we learn three key ways in which a circular argument is avoided, according to Shepherd.

One, the concepts used in the questions behind the argument need to be carefully demarcated. Shepherd may think this is important because it avoids the general error of conflating concepts. However, I suggest the main reason she may include distinguishing concepts when specifically talking about circularity is that vagueness is a characteristic feature of circular arguments. A “whiff of vagueness” often arouses suspicion that an argument may be circular, as does over-inclusive terms^[ix]. Nevertheless, circularity, although difficult to pin down and prove, can try to steer clear of vagueness and “be rescued by a distinction”^[x]. Furthermore, if an argument is “relying on the ambiguity of” a word or term by, for instance, exploiting various connotations people have, then it also constitutes a “misuse of Etymology”^[xi]. Indeed, question begging words and phrases is something we see Shepherd criticising Berkeley for so this must be an aspect of circularity and question begging that Shepherd took into account. Shepherd writes:

“In the sentence already commented on, and which contains the sum of Dr. Berkeley's doctrine—the word object, as well as the phrase "perception by sense" is of ambiguous application;—for in his use of the word object, he begs the question;”^[xii]

Furthermore, Shepherd argues that this is not an unusual oversight, given that she has not encountered anyone who doesn’t beg the question when using the word “senses”^[xiii]. Not only is Shepherd’s views on question begging and circularity relevant to her criticism of a central doctrine Berkeley expounded (as well as others such as Hume) but, I think, it is also specifically relevant to Shepherd’s approach when examining the topic of miracles where, as I explore later, the root origins and meanings of the word miracle influence the content and structure of Hume and Shepherd’s philosophical arguments.

Two, Shepherd supports her claims about circularity and good reasoning skills by adding the usefulness of separating out the statements in your argument. This, I think, may be to help with the process of providing good explanations which is important in analytic philosophy where, although definitions play an important role, they are only part of the overall analytic structure of philosophical argumentation.

Three, Shepherd assists this process with the question and answer approach. Thinking about what your questions are helps to separate out your statements and answering these questions checks if you are on the right track. When asking questions together with the approach in One (of keeping concepts separate and checking for implicit assumptions and vagueness) you build a good foundation for further examining, analysing and explaining a topic^[xiv]. The question and answer format shows up whether both the explicandum and the explictum have been addressed and whether they have done enough work in the argument so that they not only provide questions but they also affirmatively provide answers too^[xv].

Moreover, not only does Shepherd spot circularity and question begging in other philosophers’ arguments, I maintain there is also clear textual evidence which shows that Shepherd does go to great pains to avoid introducing circularity into her own arguments.

One such example is when Shepherd takes the time to clarify in her ‘Preface To The Essay On The Academical Or Sceptical Philosophy’ (within her second treatise^[xvi]) that her first treatise^[xvii] was meant to have an appendix but instead it has turned into this essay. So her previous treatise and this essay need to be read and understood in conjunction with each other, not seen as separate works as such^[xviii]. Nevertheless, she states she has made sure she has not fallen into circularity between her works through making use of some of her reasoning within her first treatise when drawing conclusions in her second treatise^[xix]. One of the key ways she believes she has achieved this is by being cautious when defining what internal and external existence is, especially in relation to perceived and unperceived objects and by making sure that it leads to “clearer ideas of the method and action of causation”^[xx]. So she seems to be just as vigilant against vagueness and circularity within her own argument structure as she is when assessing others’ views.

In the introductory chapter following this preface, there is another example of Shepherd accounting for and attempting to avoid circularity in her philosophy^[xxi]. She explains that she thinks the way certain philosophers, including Reid, use the term perception begs the question because they talk about perception in relation to things that have already been perceived^[xxii]. She also elaborates on this point to avoid potential “ambiguity” in her argument by stating that her use of the word perception is mostly in line with Hume and Locke and at what times she may vary how she uses the word^[xxiii].

Hence, I believe Shepherd when she states she has avoided circularity. This is one of the reasons why I suggest, when she also conversely derives arguments for her concept of and belief in God from her metaphysical arguments, she is attempting to expand on and clarify her linear argument founded on God in a way that avoids circularity. It is all too easy to jump to the conclusion that an argument looks circular at first blush but on closer inspection, discover that it isn’t^[xxiv]. Shepherd herself also notes that the general public often seem to be arguing in a circular fashion when they are not^[xxv]. There is more rational and practical content in their argument ^[xxvi]than one might suspect. Besides, even if one wished to claim Shepherd nevertheless displays some circularity, one would have to show that it is a form of circularity which was avoidable and constituted bad argumentation. Not all circularity constitutes a vicious circularity^[xxvii]. Some forms of circularity are termed virtuous circularity^[xxviii] because they are not weakening the argument. Furthermore, circularity does not necessarily mean that an argument is logically unsound or untrue^[xxix]. Indeed, it can have some benefits, such as helping to provide the “safest possible conclusion” and does not involve poor reasoning^[xxx]. For instance, there is nothing wrong with inferring from it being true that it is Friday that I should conclude that it is indeed Friday. This may be uninformative and boring but it is the most sure and true conclusion to make. So even if one whiffed some circularity in Shepherd’s philosophy, this need not be a logical flaw in itself. As Lemmon points out:

“It is often thought that to infer P from P is unsound, on the grounds that the argument is circular, but this is a misunderstanding”^[xxxi]

“…the rule of assumptions is precisely based on the principle of the soundness of a circular argument; for the rule of assumptions affirms that, given a certain proposition, we can at least infer that proposition.”^[xxxii]   

In stating her logical approach, Shepherd avoids ambiguity and creating logically fallacious arguments which, I think, in itself, makes her an important philosopher to research.

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[i] Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect : Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of That Relation, with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence Connected with the Same Subject, p89-90.

[ii] Shepherd, p90.

[iii] Shepherd, 90–91.

[iv] Shepherd, p87-8.

[v] Shepherd, p146-7.

[vi] Shepherd, p123.

[vii] Mary Shepherd, ‘“Essay VIII: That Human Testimony Is Of Sufficient Force To Establish the Credibility Of Miracles.”’, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation (Piccadilly, London, United Kingdom: John hatchard and Son., 1827), 341–42, https://archive.org/stream/essaysonpercepti00shep/#page/n7/mode/2up.

[viii] Shepherd, 342–43.

[ix] W. W. Fearnside and W. B. Holther, Fallacy The Counterfeit of Argument (USA: A Spectrum Book. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), 166–67.

[x] Fearnside and Holther, 166.

[xi] Fearnside and Holther, 168–70.

[xii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation, 204.

[xiii] Shepherd, p224-5.

[xiv] Maher.

[xv] Maher.

[xvi] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation.

[xvii] Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect : Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of That Relation, with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence Connected with the Same Subject.

[xviii] Shepherd, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected with the Doctrine of Causation, pxi-ii.

[xix] Shepherd, pxii.

[xx] Shepherd, pxii.

[xxi] Shepherd, p7-8.

[xxii] Shepherd, p7-8.

[xxiii] Shepherd, p8-9.

[xxiv] O’Rourke, ‘Handout: Circularity and Begging the Question’.

[xxv] Shepherd, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect : Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of That Relation, with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence Connected with the Same Subject, p123.

[xxvi] Shepherd, p123.

[xxvii] Maher, ‘Lecture 2 The Methodology of Explication’.

[xxviii] Maher.

[xxix] Lemmon, Beginning Logic, 34.

[xxx] Lemmon, 34.

[xxxi] Lemmon, 34.

[xxxii] Lemmon, p34.